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PRIVACY VERSUS PARENS PA TRIAE: THE ROLE
OF POLICE RECORDS IN THE SENTENCING
AND SURVEILLANCE OF JUVENILES
John C. Coffeet
The purpose of this article is to examine juvenile record systems
maintained by police authorities. A primary thesis is that current pro-
cedures governing the creation and dissemination of such records are
so severely misguided by underlying parens patriae concepts that they
often result in the purposeless stigmatization of a far greater range of
youths than the juvenile justice system has any justification in attempt-
ing to deal with. Indeed, increasing evidence suggests that the net effect
of such record keeping is to ensure that many of the subject juveniles
will mature into confirmed delinquents.
From the standpoint of the civil libertarian, existing procedures
often seem Orwellian-at least until one finds that the system is as
inefficient and pointless as it is punitive. Thus, a subsidiary theme of
this article is that current procedures blend benevolent motive and
authoritarian practice in such a way that no interest, including that of
law enforcement, is well served. In their ambiguity and apparent pur-
poselessness, juvenile police record systems and procedures seem not so
much Orwellian as Kafkaesque.
There is a larger significance to this analysis of record-keeping pro-
cedures in the juvenile justice system. The key issues involved in
juvenile record keeping-the adverse impact of labeling upon the in-
dividual, the invasion of privacy, the conflicting interests of the record
custodian, and the capacity for unintended distortion in even the most
well intentioned data handling system-are equally pressing in the
many other fields in which the state has begun to assemble, code,
and use personal data.
Assessments and characterizations of record systems are premature
at this point, however. The very phrase "juvenile record system" is
probably without meaning to many since the topic has largely escaped
serious attention. Even after the Supreme Court's decision in In re
Gault,' the unpublicized institutions of the juvenile justice system have
t Member of the New York Bar. B.A. 1966, Amherst College; LL.B. 1969, Yale Uni-
versity. Reginald Heber Smith Fellow 1969-1970. The substance of this article was presented
in a talk given at the 1970 Youth Law Conference of the National Institute on Education
in Law and Poverty.
1 387 US. 1 (1967). Attempts to survey the juvenile justice field date back only a
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remained legal terra incognita. Yet in the wake of the Court's recent
decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania2 that jury trials are not constitu-
tionally required in juvenile deliquency prosecutions, a shift in the
orientation of juvenile law reform seems inevitable. While Gault en-
couraged concentration on the trial or "adjudicatory stage of the juve-
nile court," McKeiver may herald a refocusing of attention on the
pre-judicial stages of juvenile justice-an area which the President's
Commission on-Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (upon
whose findings McKeiver heavily relied) has described as a "vast con-
tinent of sublegal dispositions ...outside of and hence beyond the
guidance and control of articulated policies and legal restraints."3
Before exploring this continent, however, it seems wise to clarify
the specific topic. This article is the outgrowth of a lawsuit, Cuevas v.
Leary,4 brought by the author and other legal services attorneys to
challenge juvenile record procedures in New York City. Specifically,
Cuevas challenged the New York Police Department's "Y.D.-" (Youth
Division) card system, under which police records on juveniles were
created and widely disseminated-all without either a formal "arrest"
or review mechanism. Essentially, plaintiffs claimed that the records
few years. A seminal legal work, cited often in Gault, was Note, Juvenile Delinquents:
The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HA-v. L. REV. 775 (1966). Earlier,
sociologists had focused on the same area. See A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
JUV EmLE JUsTIcE (1968); Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 Am. J.
SocioLoGy 206 (1964); cf. Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police
Practices, and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VANz. L. Rrv. 567 (1969).
2 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
3 THE PREsmmrr's Comnm'N oN LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUsricE, THE
CALLENGE OF CRIM IN A FaE SocIETY 82 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Canx CorMz'u
REPORT]. The term "pre-judicial stage" is widely used in discussions of the juvenile jus-
tice system to refer to court diversionary procedures which can lead to dispositions of
criminal charges against juveniles, by either police officers or probation officials at-
tached to the intake section of the juvenile court, without a formal "finding" of guilt.
4 No. 70-2017 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 21, 1970). The request for a preliminary injunc-
tion was withdrawn when the New York City Police Department entered into a stipula-
tion satisfactory to plaintiffs. The stipulation forbade the dissemination of the juvenile
records at issue to other government agencies, including the probation department and
the New York City courts, which had previously used such records in the formulation
of presentence and probationary reports. In addition, a full scale study was to be con-
ducted by the mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee (CJCC) and completed
within one year, at which point the parties would determine, based upon the CJCC's
recommendations, whether a dispute still existed. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1970, at 34,
col. 1. In addition to the author, Oscar Chase and Lawrence McGaughey (of Community
Action for Legal Services) were of counsel.
Upon completion of that study, the parties agreed to revised procedures requiring both
the annual destruction of all Y.D. reports on juveniles who had reached their seventeenth
birthday during the intervening year and the cessation of the circulation of such records
outside the Police Department.
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created were unreliable and subjected the juvenile to a "de facto ad-
judication of guilt" based solely on the opinion of the individual patrol-
man who filed the Y.D. report.
The Y.D.-l procedure will later be examined in detail; at present,
a summary of how it operates gives some idea of the possible scope and
significance of juvenile record systems.
Accused by an unidentified complainant of either a crime or
simply "misconduct," a youth is detained, questioned, or brought to the
police station, but never formally arrested. For any of a variety of
reasons-insufficient evidence, unwillingness of the complainant to
prosecute, distaste on the part of the police for excessive court ap-
pearances, or simply well meaning benevolence-he is informed that
no prosecution will result, but that he has been "registered" as a juve-
nile delinquent and that a permanent record of the incident will be
filed in the Police Department's Central Records Bureau. The scenario
may vary: police observation rather than a complaint may trigger the
questioning, the juvenile may never be actually detained, or he may not
be informed that a field report has been sent to the Central Records
Bureau. In any event, the consequence of the incident is the creation of
a police dossier without further opportunity for rebuttal or amplifica-
tion by the juvenile. The agencies, public and private, to which the
record may be disseminated include virtually all the agencies that deal
with juveniles: courts, the probation department, schools, and welfare
agencies. Each will likely read the report with what one writer has
called "the presumption of regularity": 5 the belief that trained police-
men do not often err but rather act only upon sufficient proof. Unlike
adult arrest records, such prearrest reports appear complete on their
face and are often disseminated before a dispositional notation is
inserted.6 The contents of the record vary, ranging from the simple
notation of a numerical offense code or a sketchy summary of the
incident to a lengthy description of the juvenile and his family.
It must be underscored at the outset that it is by no means certain
that practices such as those just described amount to a legally recog-
nizable injury. Considerable doubt exists that procedures at the pre-
judicial stages of juvenile court proceedings are subject to judicial re-
5 J. SKOLNICK, JusTICE WrrnouT TRLAL 198 (2d ed. 1967).
6 In New York City, for instance, adult arrest records are required to bear a notation
as to the eventual disposition of the case. N.Y. Crry POLICE DEP'T, RULES AND PROCEDURES
ch. 9; §§ 54.0-54.1 (1956). Even where this is not the case or where such requirements are
not obeyed, however, the layman should understand that an arrest is only the first step




view. Whether the individual has a right to complain of the inaccuracy
or irrelevance of information during the sentencing process is another
unresolved problem. We will later examine possible avenues for reform-
ing the sentencing process in order to minimize the impact of inaccurate
or irrelevant data. Again, a question of justiciability is central: what
legal controls can or should be formulated to protect the individual who
faces sentence? Finally, the question of the juvenile's right to privacy,
although far from settled, cannot be ignored. The ultimate issue,
broadly stated, is what legal restrictions should be placed on the




The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought
to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are
of dubious relevance.... ifihere is no trace of the doctrine in the
history of criminal jurisprudence. In re Gault.7
With these words, the Gault decision in 1967 seemed to signal the
demise of parens patriae. Five years later in McKeiver, however, the
Court appears to have come full circle from its original skepticism of
parens patriae to a concern for the preservation of the "paternal atten-
tion that the juvenile court system contemplates."8 Yet McKeiver is a
decision that is difficult to interpret. The case was decided by a mere
four-justice plurality.9 Moreover, the plurality opinion by Justice Black-
mun reveals a basic ambivalence. Blackmun traces the history of the
juvenile court movement, acknowledges its shortcomings, and even
seems to concede the plausibility of appellant's argument that, without
a jury, there exists the possibility of "prejudgment" of the juvenile de-
7 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
8 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
9 Justice Harlan concurred, maintaining his opposition to the decision in Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which extended the sixth amendment right of jury
trial to the states. Justice Brennan concurred in McKeiver, but dissented in the com-
panion cases on the ground that a juvenile's due process rights were adequately pro-
tected against possible "judicial oppression" in the absence of a jury only as long as
the trial was public and the press permitted to attend. 403 U.S. at 550. Justice Douglas,
with whom Justices Black and Marshall joined, dissented, noting the danger of pre-
judgment because of "'reports already submitted to [the judge] by the police or case-
workers in the case."' Id. at 563, quoting In re McCloud (Providence, R.. Fam. Ct. Jan.
15, 1971).
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fendant, either because of the judge's "awareness of the juvenile's prior
record and of the contents of the social file," or because of his familiarity
with certain police and probation witnesses who might communicate
the prior record to the court.10 Yet Justice Blackmun was not prepared
to conclude that the proposed remedy-the jury trial-would cure
these deficiencies; rather, he saw it as a "disruptive" force which would
terminate the juvenile court experiment. Notwithstanding its revitali-
zation of the parens patriae rationale, McKeiver thus concedes that
serious problems remain in the juvenile courts." It may not, therefore,
as it seems at first glance, signify the end of judicial reform of the juve-
nile court; rather, it may merely demonstrate an insistence that pro-
posed reforms relate directly to alleged abuses, and that they involve a
minimum disruption of the "beneficial" innovations of the juvenile
court.
The fundamental problem, however, is determining when the ju-
venile court's innovations are beneficial and when they result in abuse.
Two contradictory ideas are enunciated in McKeiver. First, the danger
of misuse of juvenile records is tacitly acknowledged. Next, the innova-
tions of the juvenile court which should not be sacrificed are asserted to
be its "informality and flexibility" at the pre-judicial and dispositional
stages-exactly the preconditions for the misuse of those records.
The danger that pre-judicial procedures will allow the misuse of
confidential data is documented in detail in the report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, and of
its special Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency. 2 McKeiver relies
heavily on these reports while at the same time stressing the preferability
of informality to rigid due process procedures. McKeiver is not the first
10 403 U.S. at 550. The danger of prejudgment was attributable to the fact that the
juvenile court judges in the defendant states could examine the probation file before
trial. See D. NENmAN, CoNvicriON: Tim DETEtmiNATiON OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHoUT
TRIAL 14 (1966).
In some states the presentence report is even considered a public document open
to all. See Manson, Studying the Offender Before the Court, 33 FED. PROBATION, June
1969, at 17. At the federal level, Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
prevents inspection prior to a plea of guilty or a verdict. See Gregg v. United States, 594
U.S. 489 (1969). Some courts have held pretrial disclosure of juvenile records to the trial
judge to constitute reversible error. In re Corey, 266 Cal. App. 2d 295, 72 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1st Dist. 1968). Thus it is interesting to speculate whether the same result would have
been reached in McKeiver if plaintiffs had not specifically sought a jury trial, but rather
a reversal because of disclosure of records.
11 403 U.S. at 543-45.
12 PRESIDENT's Com'N ON LAw ENFORCmEm"T & ADMINISTRATION or JUsTIcE, TASK




case to seem inconsistent in this regard. In Gault, Justice Fortas relied
extensively upon the lack of confidentiality in reports of police contacts
with minors to discredit the idea of the juvenile court as a benevolent
agency.13 That decision twice took notice of the counterproductive ef-
fect of informal "adjustment" procedures at the pre-judicial stage.14
But Gault, for all this emphasis, isolated the "adjudicatory stage" of the
juvenile court as the proper subject for judicial scrutiny and reform.
Indeed, the opinion expressly stated, "[W]e are not here concerned
with... the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process." 15
This deliberate refusal to consider the pre-judicial stage, however,
appears to be more the product of judicial caution than of lack of
concern. While juvenile records are misused, the locus of the abuse is
within an area the Court has declined to enter in the belief that it
might disrupt desirable experimentation. The Court's policy of salutary
neglect of the pre-judicial area is probably motivated by the same
foreboding that seems to have dissuaded it from applying an equal
protection analysis to juvenile courts,16 namely the fear that truly
13 In most States the police keep a complete file of juvenile "police contacts"
and have complete discretion as to disclosure of juvenile records. Police depart-
ments receive requests for information from the FBI and other law-enforcement
agencies, the Armed Forces, and social service agencies, and most of them gener-
ally comply. Private employers word their application forms to produce informa-
tion concerning juvenile arrests and court proceedings, and in some jurisdictions
information concerning juvenile police contacts is furnished private employers as
well as government agencies.
587 U.S. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 26, 51. Such procedures have been found to "engender in the child a sense
of injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of authority
by judges and probation officers." CRIME CoMM'N REPORT 85. See S. WHEELER & L. Cor-
TRELL, JuvENiLE DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 32-33 (1966).
15 387 U.S. at 13. More recently, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), Justice
Brennan emphasized that this limit still held. Id. at 359 n.l. He was answering the com-
plaint of Justice Harlan that the Court was approaching a requirement of "automatic
congruence" between adult and juvenile judicial administration. But see text accom-
panying note 3 supra.
16 Gault never cites the equal protection clause for its holding, and is therefore a
"due process" case. The significance of this has been frequently commented upon. See
Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY L.Q., Dec.
1967, at 1; Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive Stasis, 1970
Wis. L. REv. 431. A general consensus appears to exist that the Court has adopted much
the same "selective incorporation" approach with regard to the juvenile court that it
has applied for two decades to the states. The failure to utilize equal protection as a
basis for reform is open to considerable criticism. Presumably, if special aspects of the
juvenile justice system are in fact beneficial or rehabilitative, their preservation would
be justified even within an equal protection framework, since a rational basis would exist
for the distinction between adult and juvenile procedures. See Note, The Supreme Court,
1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 161 n.23 (1970).
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beneficial innovations of the juvenile court might have to be abandoned
simply because they deviated from procedures at the adult criminal
level. Yet, limiting the penetration of the Bill of Rights to the
adjudicatory stage can be justified only if problems at the pre-judicial
stage are considered to be basically peripheral.
Since Gault, a number of lower court opinions have relied on its
philosophy, rather than on its holding, to review questions of pre-judi-
cial procedures. 12 However, a process of judicial education remains
necessary. Appellate courts have not yet been sensitized to the real sig-
nificance' s of pre-judicial procedures. Perhaps the most telling fact
about the juvenile court is that the majority of juveniles taken into
custody are subjected to station house or probation department pro-
cedures without an opportunity for a hearing or chance for review of
official action, and that these procedures usually involve the creation of
a police record and often the imposition of sanctions. 19 Ultimately, the
importance of the pre-judicial stage is such that a policy of benign ne-
glect by the courts cannot be justified. Particularly through the use of
record systems, personnel in the pre-judicial stage have in effect begun
to parallel and even preempt the role of the juvenile court judge as the
legally authorized fact finder and dispositional authority. Reform of the
adjudicatory stage, which was the thrust of the cases from Gault to
McKeiver, without more, may prove to be a myopic and futile exer-
cise. The advantages, disadvantages, and abuses of current pre-judicial
and dispositional practices must be analyzed, balanced, and reconciled.
17 See Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring probable cause
inquiry at detention hearing); Conover v. Montemuro, 304 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(holding justidable the question of whether the juvenile has a right to a preliminary
hearing and presentment to a grand jur prior to referral to juvenile court); Baldwin v.
Lewis, 800 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (requiring probable cause inquiry at detention
hearing); Pilard v. Clark County Juv. Ct. Serv., 457 P.2d 523 (Nev. 1969) (right to
speedy trial recognized). A good but no longer up-to-date discussion of these issues is
in Glen, supra note 16. For recent studies of the intake stage, see CLEARINGHOUSE REV.,
May 1971, at 12.
18 Even before Gault, students of juvenile court had argued that its handling of
the predelinquent child was particularly deficient, and that youths had often been
abandoned to the indifferent attention of the pre-judicial stages. For a short recital of
the pre-Gault criticism, see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1231-33 (1966).
19 While a variety of statistical estimates exist, they agree that the majority of
juveniles taken into custody (using only the formal test of whether they were brought
into the station house) are handled either within the police agency or by referral to
"socal welfare" agencies. For FBI statistics see FEDERAL BuRaAu OF INVESTnGATiON, US.
DEp'T OF JusncE, CRUME IN THE UNrTED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPoRTS-1969, at 104




AN OVERVIEW OF THE POLICE-JUVENILE ENCOUNTER
A. The Practice in New York City
In 1969, 58,681 juveniles received Y.D.-1 records in New York
City.20 Also in 1969, the Youth Records Section of the New York Police
Department made at least 41,392 "record searches" to determine a ju-
venile's Y.D. report history, either at the request of another agency or
court or to determine whether a subsequent incident should be "ad-
justed" or formally prosecuted.21 The record that is the subject of this
intense activity is a small snap-out form, carried by each individual
patrolman, upon which he enters basic identification data about a juve-
nile and a legal conclusion (for example, "shoplifting," "harassment,"
or "disorderly conduct") based either on the patrolman's observations
or upon a complainant's report.22 The patrolman's immediate superior,
the precinct desk officer, may review the record when submitted and
decide that the incident does not deserve more serious treatment, that
is, arrest. Alternatively, if the youth has been arrested, the desk officer
may decide to reduce the police action to a Y.D. report.23 In either event,
20 Youth Aid Div., N.Y. City Police Dep't, Annual Report: 1969, at 1. The year
1969 was employed by the CJCG staff in making all statistical comparisons, as 1969 was
the last complete year in which procedures were unaffected by Cuevas v. Leary. In that
year, 18,28 "juveniles" (minors under the age of 16) and 54,393 "youths" (ages 16-21)
were arrested or detained. Id. Since Police Department regulations, although inconsistent,
do not seem to intend to authorize the filing of Y.D. cards on minors over the age of
16, and since such over-16 Y.D. reports are in any event rare (see note 26 infra), the
53,681 figure seems to imply that a 3:1 ratio exists between the issuance of a Y.D. report
and the making of a formal arrest in the cases of those juveniles who fall within the
scope of the procedure.
21 Youth Aid Div., supra note 20. This figure, however, represents only the tip of
the iceberg, since the same records are also stored at each of the 17 regional Youth Aid
Division headquarters and often at local precincts, where they are more readily accessible
to the police and probation officers of that particular area.
22 In addition to the original or "yellow sheet" form, three carbon copies are filed
by the patrolman. One is sent to the Police Department's Statistical and Records Office,
which prepares a monthly computer printout of all Y.D.-l cards issued. The other two
copies are sent to the appropriate Youth Aid Unit covering a geographical area; from
there they are communicated to the Central Records Bureau of the Police Department.
The original is kept by the precinct in which the card was issued. Roughly similar
procedures are followed in the case of Y.D. reports issued by the other uniformed police
forces in New York.
23 The basic authorizing regulation for the Y.D. card reads as follows:
Any other case of a child under 16 accused of a violation of law shall be
immediately brought to the attention of the desk officer of the precinct of oc-
currence. In these cases, the desk officer may direct the preparation of Y.D. 1
or, at his discretion, that the child be taken into custody and charged with
juvenile delinquency . . . . In the exercise of such discretion, desk officers shall
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no further attempt is made to determine the accuracy of the report be-
fore it is permanently recorded; indeed, no systematic procedure exists
to supplement or revise the report even if its invalidity is subsequently
conceded in an investigation by the Youth Aid Division. Such a fol-
low-up investigation will result if the incident is deemed serious or if
similar reports have been filed on the subject juvenile. From the mo-
ment the Y.D. report is filed, further activity only seeks to determine
if the youth has reformed or if referral to another agency, including the
courts or the probation department, is necessary.
Although the Y.D. system is in part a lesser alternative to arrest, it
is also much more. From its inception, according to the commanding
officer of the Youth Aid Division, the Y.D. system has been "'directed
toward locating those youngsters ... whose repetitive police contacts
ultimately point to a pattern of incipient delinquency.' "24 This aim was
to be realized "'by establishing a police program broader than the his-
torical and conventional police approach for the enforcement of laws
dealing with adults.' "25 In short, Y.D. reports seem intended to consti-
tute a distant early warning system for the detection of certain forms of
social deviance28 on the theory that such deviance will ultimately be
consider the manner in which the act charged was committed, the child's
previous record as ascertained from records of the precinct and the Youth Records
Section, the recommendation of a member of the Youth Aid Division, if present,
and any other pertinent facts and circumstances.
N.Y. CITY PoLICE DEP'T, RULEs AND PROCEDuRES ch. 9, § 62.2 (1956) (emphasis added).
24 SPECIAL COMM. ON TiE YD 1 SYsrr oF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING
COUNCIL, STAFF REPORT: JUvENIL RECoRD-KEEPING IN NEw Yoan CrrY 23 (K. McMahon
& N. Dubler eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPOR. This report was a summary
of the various research projects conducted under the auspices of the CJCC on the Y.D.-1
system pursuant to the Cuevas stipulation. Its methodology and recommendations will
be discussed infra. For the complete text of the commanding officer's statement, see STAFF
REPORT app. B, exhibit V. Although this article will cite data and conclusions made by
the Staff Report, it is not intended as a summary of that report, nor does it endorse
the Staff Report's conclusions in all respects. In particular, the point of view expressed
herein is divergent from that of the Staff Report on the desirability of a low noncriminal
threshold of police attention and the benevolent effects of that attention on juveniles.
25 STAFF REPORT 23.
26 Although the regulation governing the procedure for filing YfD. reports (note 23
supra) seems to speak in terms of actual "violation of law," New York City Police De-
partment regulations make clear the breadth of situations in which Y.D. reports are to
be issued:
JUvENIE REPORT FILE
6/58.0 The following complaints shall be on Y.D. 1 (Juvenile Report):
a. Juvenile delinquency ...
b. Petty violations by minors where no summonses are served or arrests made
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
transformed into criminal behavior. Serious questions may be addressed
to the Y.D. system: (1) does the record system's receptivity to a wide
scope of data, along with the absence of controls, invite distortion and
innaccuracy? (2) is it realistic to entrust the handling of sensitive data
to a police agency? and (3) what is the likelihood that the collection
of data will be counter-productive by causing the subject juvenile to
modify his own behavior in the belief that he has been identified as a
"delinquent"?
1. Issuance
Data compiled as a result of Cuevas emphasized two principal
differences at the issuance stage in the Y.D. report system.27 No com-
mon standard for the issuance of Y.D. reports was found to exist,
making it possible for observed conduct in one precinct to go unre-
ported while identical conduct in another precinct was reported.
c. Persons in need of supervision . . .
d. Wayward minors . . .
e. Male children under 16 years of age or female children under 18 years of
age who are neglected
f. Children under 16 years of age who are the subject of a crime
g. Intoxicated minors under 18 years of age ...
h. Males under 16 and females under 18 years of age found in a house of
prostitution . ..
i., Stranded and runaway males 16 to 21 years of age . . .
j. Runaway males under 16 and females under 18 years of age ...
k. Child unlawfully present in licensed premises . . .
1. Truant . . . bootblack and newsboy violations.
N.Y. CrrY POLICE DEP'T, RULES AND PROCEDURES ch. 6, § 58.0 (1956). Even this list is
incomplete. For additional legal categories see id. ch. 6, §§ 59.0-59.2.
27 Since the initiation of suit in Cuevas, information on Y.D. reports has become
available from three basic sources. First, there is the basic statistical data supplied by
the Police Department to the CJCC pursuant to the stipulation, as well as its explanation
of the reasons for the Y.D. system. Secondly, the research conducted by the CJCC's
volunteer staff included extensive field studies and interviews by members of a graduate
law seminar of New York University Law School who accompanied individual police-
men on patrol. Some 37 individual field reports were submitted by law students accom-
panying police and Transit Authority patrolmen, or observing locations of high Y.D.
activity. See STArF REPORT 7-8. From these two sources comes the bulk of the following
information on the factual settings in which Y.D. reports were issued and the extent of
their disssemination. Similar, if less extensive, field studies were conducted by officials
of The Legal Aid Society and The Vera Foundation of Justice foliowing Cuevas. A
third, and probably the most revealing source of data, was an analysis of Y.D. records
by a team of political scientists who, using basically statistical techniques, evaluated (1)
the clarity of the actual entries on the Y.D. reports as well as the frequency of distortion
in the data handling process, and (2) the relationship between a juvenile's history of
Y.D. reports and the disposition of a current Y.D. report on him. Hanna, Zeitz & Ferns,
A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of YD 1 Cards Issued in 1969, in STr- REPORT app.
A [hereinafter cited as Statistical Study]. The authors were members of the political
science faculty of both the University of the City of New York and Hunter College.
[Vol. 57:571
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Paralleling this discrepancy there appeared to be widely variant under-
standings with regard to the purpose of the Y.D. procedure-whether
it should be punitive or therapeutic. Additionally, the determinative
factor in the issuance decision, given the wide range of incidents which
could result in a Y.D. report, was found to be the interplay between
the juvenile's attitude and the police officer's background and tolerance.
The Police Department's own statistics reveal the limited effort
that is made to ensure the accuracy of the data entered on Y.D. reports.
These statistics show that nearly eighteen percent of Y.D. reports were
issued simply on the complaint of a citizen without police investiga-
tion.28 Thus the Cuevas-inspired Criminal Justice Coordinating Com-
mittee (CJCC) Staff Report concluded that a subsidiary function of the
Y.D. system was "to 'take the heat off' when a citizen demands that
some sort of action be taken."
29
Even more pointed was the finding that the New York City Transit
Authority (a separate uniformed police force responsible for New York
City's subways), which in fact regularly issues more Y.D. reports than the
Police Department, had little conception of the procedure's benevolent
purpose and saw it instead as a form of summary punishment. Faced
with the problem of 350,000 juveniles using the subways during school
rush hours and with situations which made arrest impractical, the
Transit Authority patrolmen viewed the Y.D. report primarily as a
device to maintain order. Any form of loud or boisterous behavior in
a subway station, or behavior which signified disrespect for authority
by a juvenile, was likely to result in a Y.D. report, simply to dampen
potential disruption in the larger group. 0 In contrast the Housing
28 Souazc oF Y.D.-I Rs'oRTs-1969
Source Percent





Parents & Relatives 1.0
Personal Applications 0.9
Sodal Agendes 0.3
Youth Aid Div., supra note 20, at 5.
29 STAF REPORT 28.
80 "[M]ost felt that overlooking disrespectful attitudes, particularly in front of a
group of other juveniles, could only diminish their authority before the children, and
thus reduce their capacity to keep order."
Id. at 31.
One transit officer is quoted to the effect that where groups of children were involved
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Authority police disdained the use of the Y.D. report in dealing with
minor incidents.31 Instead, Housing Authority officers were the only
major law enforcement officials who employed the Y.D. card in situ-
ations where a felony arrest might otherwise have been made.3 2
As to the factors that determined whether marginal conduct would
receive a Y.D. report, the Staff Report noted:
[O]bservers in general reported that regardless of the severity of
the offense, a brash, antagonistic, unrepentant, and, most impor-
tant, disrespectful child was almost assured of receiving a card. At
the other end of the continuum, for all but the most serious of-
fenses, a repentant attitude was the best assurance of avoiding one.
A number of reports also stressed the setting in which the incident
took place: a less repentant attitude, or a more serious offense
might be excused if the child were alone, but if the conduct oc-
curred in the presence of others, officers felt obliged to take a strict
approach.3
Variations in the officer's own background and attitude were also
important. Officers with "a social service outlook" (in the words of the
Staff Report) tolerated conduct and attitudes which would have led
more disciplinarian officers not only to issue a Y.D. card, but to register
the incident under the most severe offense category available.34 There
was a similar division, at least among lower echelon police officers inter-
viewed, as to whether the function of the Y.D. card was to build a
record for future punitive action or to find means for social assistance
to troubled youths.3 5
Except for the observation that many youths regarded Y.D. cards
as "status symbols" and actually solicited them,3 6 the effect of the issu-
ance of a Y.D. report upon the subject youth was ignored by the Cuevas
studies.
he would issue a report over a "dropp[ed] gum wrapper" in order "to soften them up."
Id. at g0. It is interesting to speculate whether such an attitude does not invite demon-
strations of juvenile defiance.
31 A more effective sanction employed by Housing Authority police in marginal
cases where the other police units would issue Y.D. reports was to threaten the parents
of the juvenile with eviction. See id. at 32.
32 The decision between such an arrest and issuance of a Y.D. card would usually
be made, it was found, after the Housing Authority patrolman telephoned the local
police precinct station to check the youth's past Y.D. record. Id.
33 Id. at 31. See also id. at 28, 57.
34 Id. at 29. One police officer stated that he describes the offense as severely as
possible because the Y.D. reports are "nails in the coffin." Id. at 28.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 29. Attorneys for the plaintiffs in Cuevas invited the staff of the CJCC to
interview various juveniles to gauge their attitudes. The offer, however, was declined.
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2. Content
If Y.D. records are to serve any useful purpose-either punitive or
therapeutic-it must be assumed that identical notations on the records
are at least intended to correspond to similar incidents, and that dis-
similar notations are not meant to describe the same fact pattern. Yet
neither of these assumptions proved valid in the Cuevas studies. On
the contrary, the Statistical Study commissioned by the CJCC found
that: (1) the offense descriptions entered on the Y.D. record were vague,
often consisting only of a legal conclusion (for example, "harassment"
or "disorderly conduct"), and that such notations could be based on a
.ide range of conduct, from the trivial to the serious; and (2) the
elaborate nomenclature of offense categories devised to facilitate classi-
fication of Y.D. reports tended to classify the same behavior under a
variety of different categories.37
In short, what the police officer or citizen-complainant allegedly
observed was translated into recorded data which consistently failed to
distinguish insignificant incidents from more serious ones and which
sorted similar incidents into different overlapping categories. From
whatever perspective a subsequent decision maker thus approached the
data, he would be unable to discern from it the specific facts that
would be most useful to him.
The New York Police Department has developed an offense code of
some 180 categories into which individual Y.D. reports are classified in
order to simplify data handling. A police officer filling out a Y.D. report,
or a subsequent Youth Aid investigator to whom the card is referred,
will use this five-digit code to indicate offenses ranging from the serious
("menacing a police officer") to the trivial ("objectionable play").38 The
officer is also expected to write a brief description of the offense, al-
though this offense description appears regularly to be condensed to the
numerical offense code only when the data is transmitted to agencies.
Employing a random sampling technique, the Statistical Study con-
cluded that in only sixty percent of the Y.D. reports was the specific
statement of the misconduct clear.39 Frequently the description added
little to the offense code: for example, "X was disorderly at time and
place of occurrence," or "defendant with one other did loiter in base-
ment of apartment house."
37 Statistical Study 12, 20.
38 For the complete Y.D. code list, dated as of December 12, 1969, see S'AF R oRT
app. B, exhibit VI. Coding, it appears, is most often done at the Youth Aid Divisiom
Thus the person doing the coding is not the officer who saw the act or received the
complaint. See id. at 59. Such a division of responsibility does little to ensure accuracy.
39 Statistical Study 15.
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The sixty percent figure in fact understates the degree of ambiguity
found. In the case of certain offense categories-most notably "runaway"
and "truant"--the vast majority of reports either contained no particu-
larization of the incident or were so muddled in their descriptions that
the researchers had to classify them as "vague."40 Considerably more
serious, however, is the existence of entirely nonspecific categories. An
example of this is the "disorderly conduct" notation. 41 "Disorderly
conduct" was the offense category in approximately twenty percent of
the Y.D. reports issued in 1969. In practice the accompanying descrip-
tion was commonly only a statement that the youth was "loud and
boisterous" or "annoying to passersby." The use of such a category
raises two quite distinct problems.
First, it obviously invites subjective judgment as to what constitutes
an offense by failing to specify the factors that should influence that
judgment. In all likelihood it also invites the patrolman to equate
behavior of which he disapproves with illegality.42 The finding that Y.D.
reports of nonspecific offenses (for example, "harassment," "loitering,"
and "disorderly conduct") were considerably more ambiguous in their
description of incidents than those of specific offenses substantiates this
possibility.43 Secondly, because nonspecific categories overlapped other
categories, it was possible for identically written descriptions of the same
observed behavior to be accompanied by different offense codes. The
choice of category is not insignificant: whether a scuffle is characterized
as "harassment" or "assault" can possibly influence future decision
makers.44
Misclassification was also found to occur simply as the result of
40 "Vague" was used as a term of art by the Statistical Study to mean, in addition
to sheer incomprehensibility, that the supporting steps in a legal conclusion were lacking.
See id. at 8-15.
41 Offenses that were grouped under this heading in the random sample analyzed
by the Statistical Study included: "theft," "demonstrations at Board of Education,"
"causing crowd to gather," "skylarking on elevators,"' "urinating in station," "fighting,"
and "extortion." See id. at 19-20. The third most popular category, "harassment, un-
classified," encompassing five percent of Y.D. reports, covered almost as wide a range of
behavior. Under this heading were typically grouped trespassing, theft, and disorderly
conduct, as well as any incident in which some sort of physical assault, serious or minor,
occurred. See id. at 20.
42 Cf. Coates v. Cindigati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S.
544 (1971). Recently a federal court found New York's "wayward minor" statute un-
constitutionally vague. Gesicki v. Oswald, 36 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Thus juvenile
law is not exempt from the requirement that criminal statutes prescribe precise substantive
standards.
43 Statistical Study 15.
44 Another example is throwing rocks at trains, which was alternately classified as
"reckless endangerment," "criminal mischief," or "disorderly conduct." Id. at 21.
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coding errors. For example, facts describing a fight might be given the
code number for shoplifting. The extent of misclassification found in
the Statistical Study's random sample was staggering: over twenty-five
percent of the Y.D. reports for "disorderly conduct" and forty-four
percent of those issued for "harassment, unclassified" were deemed to
be improperly classified, either because a more specific offense code
category existed or because the facts as described plainly fell within
another category.
45
In summarizing its findings the Statistical Study concluded that
nearly half of 1969's Y.D. cards were "issued for behavior which, ex-
ercising discretion differently, might not have been administratively
acted upon." 46 In these cases the subject juvenile may have suffered a
double injury: (1) the system under which he has been reported lacks
substantive standards to ensure that similar conduct elsewhere will
also be reported; and (2) the significance of the report is distorted by
the tendency of the record system to lump dissimilar events under a
common notation and to classify similar events under different nota-
tions.
3. Follow-up Procedures
The basic rationale of the Y.D. record system is that the reports will
be employed to locate youths who need some form of social assistance.
To .implement this purpose a copy of every Y.D. report is sent to the
appropriate Youth Aid Division for investigaton. Eventually, the re-
cipient Youth Aid Division will add a "closing code" to the record,
signifying its disposition of the case.
The following data show the range of dispositions in 1969:47
Disposition All 1969 Y.D.'s (percent)
Precautionary Letter 30.0
No Other Service Indicated (NOSI) 20.0
Referrals 39.4
Other 10.3
The first two categories, encompassing fifty percent of 1969's Y.D.-l re-
ports, represent situations in which the Youth Aid investigation did not
progress beyond the mailing of a form letter or a cursory preliminary
investigation. Disposition is mechanical and automatic. The final cate-
gory, "other," included a potpourri of resolutions, such as the disap-
45 Id. at 16.
46 Id. at 41.
47 Id. at 23, table 6. Difference from 100% results from rounding.
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pearance of the youth48 or even a decision that the charge was un-
founded. Again, however, no further social inquiry occurs. While over
thirty-nine percent of the reports were referred to "agencies," this
proportion includes referrals to agencies where no counseling or thera-
peutic programs exist, such as the Bureau of Attendance in the case of
"truancy" Y.D. reports. Although these percentages do not establish that
the Y.D. system is ineffective in isolating the true "problem" child and
referring him to social assistance, they do suggest that the system is
fundamentally overloaded in that it acquires more data than it can put
to meaningful use.
A second deficiency is the follow-up procedure's indifference to the
accuracy or inaccuracy of the initial Y.D. report. In at least forty percent
of Y.D. cases (the precautionary letter and the "other" dispositions), no
attempt is made to check "the validity of the initial decision to classify
the behavior as an offense." 49 Although the Youth Aid Division officers
are empowered to use "unfounded" as a closing code on Y.D. reports
(in which event the card is still permanently preserved), such a notation
is officially discouraged.50 Moreover, the exclusive purpose of the follow-
up investigation is to determine what referral should be made,51 that is,
how to "correct" the juvenile's incipient social deviance. The juvenile's
protestations of innocence may be seen as evidence of an "unrepentent"
attitude, and might lead to court referral.52 Because the procedure is
intended to assist the child, innocence appears to be irrelevant.
The Statistical Study also demonstrated a one hundred percent
correlation between a past history of four or more Y.D. reports and a
48 Approximately 40% of cases in the "other" category have the subclassification
"unable to locate." The frequency of this designation plus the casual issuance procedure
suggests that a number of youths simply evade the procedure by giving an alias. Several
youths reported this technique (or that of giving a friend's name) to the author.
49 Statistical Study 41.
50 According to the Police Department's own Definition and Clarification of Closing
Codes, "Investigators should be especially thorough regarding cases dosed as unfounded
and shall interview all persons concerned with the complaint before dosing the case.
Stamp all cases UNFOUNDED after Unit Supervisor approves and signs case." STAFF
REPoRT app. B, exhibit IX (emphasis in original). Although only eight percent of the
"other" category, or less than one percent of the total Y.D. cards issued, are labeled "un-
founded," the Statistical Study found that careful analysis of other dosing codes showed
that the investigator often believed the matter to have been in fact unfounded; yet the
"unfounded" designation was not employed. Statistical Study 24.
51 Statistical Study 58.
52 An important factor, according to the Statistical Study, in whether a case was
dosed or referred (possibly to a court) was the "impression made by the youth and/or
his family." The claim of innocence was seen to show an uncooperative attitude. The
safe response to avoid referral was, "yes, officer, my son needs help." Id. at 37.
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"referral."53 Conversely, the odds were high that youths without a prior
Y.D. record would receive only a precautionary letter or a NOSI dis-
position. Obviously, where past citations are simply for "disorderly
conduct" or a similar offense, an automatic referral policy is highly
questionable.5 Again, widely differing forms of behavior are equated
because of imprecise record-keeping procedures with the result that the
discretion of subsequent decision makers is prejudiced.
4. Dissemination
Until the CJCC investigation, the number of public and private
agencies having official access to Y.D. reports was largely unknown.
Even the official dissemination list maintained by the Youth Records
Section of the Police Department proved incomplete.5 5 Basically, how-
ever, recipients fell within four categories: (1) public agencies author-
ized to deal with juvenile misconduct (for example, the courts and the
probation department); (2) social welfare agencies concerned with
juveniles; (3) public bodies seeking personal information; and (4) cer-
53 Id. at 30. For juveniles with no Y.D. history, referral occurred in only 20% of
the cases. Juveniles with one to three cards had a 40% chance of referral. The study
concluded: "Mhe number of a youth's previous offenses is a dear determinant in the
tvo discretionary decisions ... of the Y.D. 1 process: whether to investigate and whether
to refer." Id. at 45.
This finding is confirmed at least in part by Jack Whalen of The Vera Institute for
Justice. Interview, Oct. 15, 1970. When a juvenile acquires what the Youth Division
characterizes as an "accordian file, namely one that is expanding at a rapid rate, it
may decide that it is in the juvenile's best interest to be referred to court. The
police therefore determine in advance to seize upon the next Y.D. report, however
minor, as an occasion for court referral. Such referral also may be initiated either
by the Youth Division officials, (1) inducing the youth's parents to file a PINS (Person
in Need of Supervision) petition against the child; (2) filing one themselves; or (3) con-
vincing a probation officer to file a petition alleging a violation of any previous
order of disposition if the juvenile had been earlier adjudicated a delinquent. Inducing
the parent to file a petition after other agencies have refused to file a Neglect or PINS
petition is apparently common. After trial the file of past Y.D. reports will be tendered
at the dispositional hearing-with an effect that often may well surprise the parents or
other parties who believed their petitions would trigger only a mild court warning.
51 In approximately 20% of the cases, the euphemism "referred" means referral
directly to court and the probable initiation of a prosecution. Statistical Study 27, table
8A. Over 5,600 Y.D. cases were referred to court in 1969. Youth Aid Div., supra note 20,
at 5.
"Referral" can also imply civil commitment as a narcotics addict or psychotic, or
criminal commitment for parole violations (which in 1969 did not require a court hear-
ing).
55 For the official list see SrArF RExoRT app. B, exhibit IV. The Staff Report re-
vealed additional authorized recipients, but concluded that even its list may have been
incomplete. Id. at 43. In at least one instance a juvenile's Y.D. record was given by the
Police Department to the press. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1970, at 67, cols. 1-2.
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tan specialized miscellaneous agencies (for example, branches of the
armed forces and the Civilian Complaint Review Board). The Staff
Report summarized its findings with regard to the flow of Y.D. informa-
tion in the form of a variant of Parkinson's Law: "The use of informa-
tion, once filed, will expand to the capacity of the system." 5
The CJCC staff studied only access to the centralized Y.D. files.
Two separate investigations conducted respectively by a staff member of
The Vera Institute for Justice and by a staff attorney of The Legal Aid
Society57 focused on practices at divisional and precinct headquarters
where the cards are also filed. The Vera observer found that Y.D. reports
were regularly disseminated to such varied organizations as the Boy
Scouts, Catholic Charities, and community anti-poverty corporations.58
Prior to Cuevas such practices were neither illegal nor unauthorized,
since police regulations permitted dissemination to any "authorized
agency concerned with the welfare of the child." 59 The Legal Aid Society
study found additionally that prospective employers often consulted a
juvenile's probation officer to ascertain his complete history, including
Y.D. reports. 60
In addition, the type and extent of information transmitted varies
widely, as the Staff Report noted.
The information may be released in a variety of forms;
one agency may request only the number of offenses, while another
may seek the categories of offenses, still another summaries of the
complaints, while one may actually ask for the information avail-
able. Any or all of the above may or may not ask for the disposi-
tion accorded the complaint by the Youth Aid Unit.61
Given the vagueness of the offense categories and the fact that the of-
fense coding is only infrequently done by the patrolman issuing the
56 STAFF REPORT 71.
57 Sussman, Confidentiality of Records on Juveniles in Family Court, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
8, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
58 Interview, supra note 53. During the greater part of 1970 Mr. Whalen was in-
volved with a project seeking to design a community based probation system and, as a
result, was a regular observer at various Youth Aid Division proceedings. In contrast
the CJCC staff was denied permission to attend Youth Aid Division conferences with
juveniles.
59 "Authorization" appears to have been the prerogative of the divisional commander,
with the central list of the Youth Records Section only an "indication" of authorized
agencies. STAFF REPoRT 54.
60 Sussman, supra note 57, at 1, col. 5. See In re Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 200 n.4,
310 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 n.4 (N.Y. City Fain. Ct. 1970); N. Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1970, at 49,
col. I (reporting widespread illegal sale of police records).
61 STAFF REPORT 54.
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card, such fragmentary transmission makes distortion virtually un-
avoidable.6
2
In fairness to probation officials, it should be noted that they often
recognize Y.D. cards as an unreliable source of information. Yet a
definite possibility exists that well meaning officials will still be in-
fluenced by information they admit to be of limited reliability or rele-
vance. As the Staff Report indicated, the hunger for data may convert
inferences into fact and ambiguity into injury:
One may observe a Gresham's Law of information in operation:
the bad information drives out the good, simply because the latter
is less accessible. In context this means that it is easier and quicker
to rely on what purports to be a past "record" than to discover the
relevant information from other sources, such as interviews with
the defendant, his family and those who have continuing contact
with him.63
In other words, overworked agencies such as the probation department
may rely on doubtful data merely because they must reach a conclusion
and have no time for independent investigation.
B. The National Practice
Nationally, most offenses for which a juvenile is taken into custody
are handled solely by the station house and the pre-judicial adjuncts of
juvenile court.64 The process by which charges are adjusted, that is, the
62 To understand fully the variety of injuries this distortion can cause, one must
understand the breadth of discretion accorded the Office of Probation and the Youth
Council Bureaus in New York. Of the cases referred to family court, some 56% to
40% are "adjusted" at intake annually. See LEGAL REPRESENTATION oF THE POOR: TiH
NEw YoRK Crry ExPERIENcE 139 (PLI 1970) (statement of Marion M. Brennan, Deputy
Dir., N.Y. City Office of Probation). The Office of Probation emphasizes its efforts to
avoid court hearings in the belief that they are an "acculturation to delinquency." Id. at
140.
"Adjustment" means simply that the youth is never arraigned or required to plead.
A maximum 60-day period of probation may follow. Intake is basically an ex parte
proceeding at which attorneys seldom appear. See Rosenheim & Skoler, The Lawyer's
Role at Intake and Detention Stages of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 CRIME & DELIN-
qUENcY 167, 173 (1965) (presence of an attorney at the intake stage is a rarity and in
some courts is not known to occur); Note, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court
Intake Processes, 13 ST. Louis L.J. 69 (1968). Distortion of facts from fragmentary trans-
missions of data (as where only the number of Y.D. reports is considered) may influence
the decision to "adjust" at intake. Analogous opportunities for nonjudicial disposition of
young adults also exist at the criminal court, where the Y.D. file again is frequently
consulted.
63 STAFF REPORT 77.
64 According to Professors Joel Handler and Margaret Rosenheim, approximately 80%
of adolescents who are taken into custody never make an appearance before a judge. This
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procedures that are employed, the criteria used, and the range of sanc-
tions assigned, however, varies considerably.65 It is known that the
frequency of record dissemination and the occasions for consequent
injury at the juvenile level are far greater than at the adult level.66 The
adjustment process often seems intended as a form of summary punish-
ment; minor deprivations such as special curfews, restrictions on sports
or dating, and even freedom of movement, are regularly assigned as an
alternative to formal court appearances.6"
Ironically, the sanction for refusal to accept adjustment is court
referral and the creation of permanent, but generally confidential,
court records, while the police records created by adjustment are likely
to be at least as lasting and far more accessible. 6 In addition, arrest
figure would include cases adjusted both by the police and by the probation staff at intake.
Some 70% of Chicago's juvenile cases are handled within the Police Department. Handler &
Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAw &
CoNTMrd. PROB. 377, 395 (1966). See Note, supra note 1, at 776 n.5. FBI statistics sub-
stantiate these estimates. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 19.
The national significance of juvenile records is underscored by the American Bar
Foundation's recent study on sentencing practices. The study found that probation of-
ficials preparing presentence reports on juveniles seldom seek court records, because they
have found much fuller and more accessible files in the youth divisions of police depart-
ments (which files seldom contain the dispositions following arrest). See R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING: Tnm DECIsION As To TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 28-30,
(1969) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCING]; cf. D. NEwMAN, supra note 10, at 15.
65 Much of the information available is strictly anecdotal. See, e.g., L. RICHETTE,
THE THROWAWAY Cmi REN 5-15 (1969), for a view of the process from the vantage point
of a juvenile court attorney in Philadelphia.
66 For a discussion of the procedures employed at the adult level, see L. TIFFANY,
D. McINTYRE &c D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRzIE 73-80 (1967). In New York City a
practice at the adult level analogous to the Y.D. system has, following Cuevas, been
terminated. A document known as the "liability notice" was sent to a landlord indicating
that a person had been arrested on his property (usually for narcotics or prostitution),
and that the landlord might be vicariously liable for permitting such activities to
continue. The notice was sent without regard to the disposition of the tenant's or other
person's case. Following Cuevas, the New York Civil Liberties Union filed suit to enjoin
this practice and obtained a stipulation terminating its use unless a conviction ensued.
N.Y. Times, March 7, 1971, at 34, col. 1.
67 For a description of Kansas City's "grounding system," under which a juvenile
might be ordered not to leave his house or to change his hair style or personal appearance,
or face prosecution on the original charge, see Note, supra note 1, at 784.
68 A family court may seal the record of a conviction (or "finding of delin-
quency'). E.g., N.Y. FAMmY Or. ACT §§ 166, 781-82 (McKinney 1963). New York City's
Family Court Rules also establish a principle of strict confidentiality of records. See In re
Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 200 n.2, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 n.2 (N.Y. City Fain. Ct. 1970). In
contrast, police records on juveniles are more readily accessible. See Note, supra note 1,
at 785. In Smith, Judge Dembitz took judicial notice that private investigators could
easily secure police arrest records. 63 Misc. 2d at 200 n.4, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 620 n.4. See
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 n.33, 493 n.35, (D.C. Cir. 1970); Note, Rights and
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records may reflect the police officer's desire to allege the highest possible
offense category.0 9
The likelihood that a juvenile's encounter with the police will
result in the application of a sanction substantially varies among rural,
suburban, and urban communities. 0 Police discretion appears to be the
critical factor in determining how a juvenile will be treated. To an
increasing extent that discretion has been formalized in regulations
making determinative the juvenile's demeanor and the presence or
absence of a record in the department's juvenile files.71 If this is the
case, then the propensity of youth divisions to focus police surveillance
activity on low-income "problem" families suggests that they are es-
sentially creating self-fulfilling prophecies: the greater the police focus,
the more information is recorded, and the more information recorded,
the greater the chance that police discretion will be influenced by the
records created thereby.72
The economic and social injury that a police record may engender
has been fully docuniented. Surveys have shown that seventy-five percent
of New York City employment agencies and ninety percent of private
employers will not accept a job applicant with an arrest record.73 Civil
service commissions appear similarly reluctant.74 Even where con-
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUm. L. REV. 281 (1967). In part, the different
treatment of police and court records is attributable to judicial uncertainty about the
power of courts over police records. Compare Weisberg v. Police Dep't, 46 Misc. 2d 846,
260 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (holding that courts lack authority), with Morrow v.
District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that "ancillary" jurisdiction
exists).
In some states a statute provides for expungement even of court records of con-
viction of juveniles. See, e.g., CAL. Wrxr. & INsr'Ns CODE: § 781 (West Supp. 1971). For
critical analysis see Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility
of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEMr. PROB. 342, 369-71 (1966).
09 See Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Of-
fenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 147, 168-78.
70 Ferster & Courtless, supra note 1, at 571.
71 Id. at 575-81; Piliavin & Briar, supra note 1, at 209-12.
72 See Ferster & Courtless, supra note 1, at 579.
73 E. SPARER, EMPLOYABILrrY AND THE JuvENILE "ARazSR" RECORD 5 (1966); Schwartz
& Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROB. 133, 134-88 (1962). This latter
survey was based on a hypothetical arrest for assault and showed that even an acquittal
would not make over two-thirds of private employers willing to consider the applicant.
74 The New York City Civil Service Commission has frequently attempted to dis-
qualify employees on the basis of arrest records. See, e.g., Adler v. Lang, 21 App. Div. 2d
107, 248 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Ist Dep't 1964); Cuccio v. Department of Personnel-Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 40 Misc. 2d 345, 243 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1968); cf. Anonymous v. New York
City Transit Authority, 4 App. Div. 2d 953, 167 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d Dep't 1957), aff'd,
7 N.Y.2d 769, 163 N.E.2d 144, 194 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1959).
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fidentiality rules exist, waivers signed by the youth regularly enable the
employer to gain access.
75
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice, although extremely critical of the character of adjust-
ment procedures and the low-visibility practices which often accompany
them,76 still concluded that their retention in a modified form was the
best of several imperfect alternatives since their total rejection would
lead to an increase in the number of juveniles formally arrested.77 The
Commission, however, while recommending that informal adjustments
be administered by civilian authorities, 78 recognized that some danger
resided in even the most benevolent program:
Official action may actually help to fix and perpetuate delinquency
in the child through a process in which the individual begins to
think of himself as delinquent and organizes his behavior accord-
ingly.... The most informed and benign treatment of the child...
contains within it the seeds of its own frustration and itself may
often feed the very disorder it is designed to cure.79
An uneasy compromise thus seems apparent. The Commission saw "ad-
75 The armed forces use such waivers as a matter of course. See In re Smith, 63 Misc.
2d 198, 200 n.3, 310 N.YS.2d 617, 619 n.8 (N.Y. City Fain. Ct. 1970). A waiver is also
required when a juvenile requests youthful offender treatment but information so ob-
tained may not be used against the offender at trial. People v. Rhem, 52 Misc. 2d 853,
276 N.Y.S2d 751 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
76 Informal and discretionary pre-judicial dispositions already are a formally
recognized part of the process to a far greater extent in the juvenile than in the
criminal justice system....
There are grave disadvantages and perils, however, in that vast continent of sub-
legal dispositions. It exists outside of and hence beyond the guidance and control
of articulated policies and legal restraints. It is largely invisible ... and hence be-
yond sustained scrutiny and criticism. Discretion too often is exercised haphazardly
and episodically, without the salutary obligation to account and without a founda-
tion in full and comprehensive information about the offender and about the avail-
ability and likelihood of alternative dispositions. Opportunities occur for illegal
and even discriminatory results, for abuse of authority by the ill-intentioned,
the prejudiced, the overzealous. Irrelevant, improper considerations-race, non-
conformity, punitiveness, sentimentality, understafting, overburdening loads-may
govern officials in their largely personal exercise of discretion. The consequence
may be not only injustice to the juvenile but diversion out of the formal channels
of those whom the best interests of the community require to be dealt with
through the formal adjudicatory and dispositional processes.
CRM CoMai'N REPORT 82.
77 Id. The Commission recommended that youths be detained only on specific
grounds for suspicion-a lesser standard than "probable cause." Id. at 79. The Com-
mission also suggested that pre-judicial functions be transferred to a civilian agency--
"a Youth Services Bureau." Id. at 82-84.
78 Id. at 82-84.
79 Id. at 80.
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justment" procedures as a preferred alternative 0 to a uniform policy of
arrest. Nonetheless, it recognized that such procedures might well prove
counterproductive because of their potential for stigmatization. Hence it
hoped to minimize this stigma by shifting the responsibility for adjust-
ment to a civilian agency.
The Commission's doubts about adjustment procedures are sub-
stantiated by the theory of sociologists Martin Gold and Jay Williams
that extended police-juvenile contacts ensure the juvenile's future
participation in deliquent acts.8 ' Gold and Williams divided the 847
adolescents they studied into two groups: (1) those who had been ap-
prehended for various small crimes;,and (2) a control group consisting of
those who had committed similar crimes and who matched the first
group in background characteristics but had escaped detection. The ap-
prehended juveniles subsequently committed a significantly greater
number of delinquent acts. From this, Gold and Williams concluded
that apprehension contributes to future delinquency. They also found
"no differences in subsequent delinquent activity between those referred
to court and those only warned and released by police."8 12 Other statis-
tical studies have drawn similar conclusions.
8 3
The idea that the labeling process involved in record keeping
encourages future delinquency has also been advanced from a psycho-
logical perspective. It is often said that it is ultimately a juvenile's "self
concept" which determines whether or not he will become a delin-
quent.8 4 If so, then to the extent that adjustment procedures modify
80 Id. at 82. The Commission emphasized three reasons why discretionary procedures
(as opposed to mandatory arrest) seem desirable. In summary, it stated: (1) application
of the full criminal process is too severe in many cases, and a need exists "to meditate
between generally formulated laws and the human values"; (2) legislatures tend to
"overcriminalize" human conduct and to employ the penal code for other purposes than
crime prevention; and (3) the sheer volume of cases demands that screening devices be
employed. TASK FORCE REPORT 10.
81 Gold g. Williams, National Study of the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 PRosPECTus
3 (1969).
82 Id. at 10-11.
83 "Self-reporting" studies have consistently revealed that most citizens have com-
mitted crimes which have not been detected or reported to the police. See, e.g., Chambers
& Nagasawa, On the Validity of Official Statistics: A Comparative Study of White, Black,
and Japanese High School Boys, 6 J. RESEARcH IN CRIME & DELINQUENcY 71 (1968). For a
rigorous examination of the concept of stigmatization, see Schwartz & Skolnick, Two
Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCLAL PROB. 138 (1962).
84 "The answer [to whether the juveniles studied will become delinquent] ... will
depend on their ability to maintain their present self-images in the face of mounting
situational pressures." Reckless, Dinitz & Murray, Self Concept as an Insulator Against
Delinquency, in READINGS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 248, 252 (D. Dressier ed. 1964).
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that "self concept" so as to induce the juvenile to conceive of himself as
delinquent, they are intrinsically self-defeating. 85
Though law enforcement officials cannot cease to apprehend juve-
niles for illegal acts, they can minimize the stigmatization involved. The
Commission's recommendation that adjustment activities be transferred
to civilian agencies is a useful step, but hardly a final one. Other es-
sential reforms include: (1) the development of standards limiting the
types of "misconduct" that might trigger police-initiated "adjustment";
(2) the creation and enforcement of confidentiality rules for any records
created; and (3) the introduction of a principle of juvenile autonomy
under which, at least in some circumstances, the juvenile could decline
to participate in whatever counseling program was offered. One writer
has suggested on the basis of the Gold and Williams study that the
juvenile be given the right to forbid police notification of his family
or neighborhood agencies when only minor misconduct is involved.86
It is admittedly premature to accept the work of Gold and Williams
or other writers as conclusive, but the policy implications of their re-
search seem clear: if delinquency is a period that can be prolonged and
encouraged by hasty stereotyping, then there is a strong social interest
in protecting the juvenile's privacy. Society cannot afford to embrace
procedures that convince the juvenile that he is a delinquent.
III
TiEoRms OF RELIEF
The remainder of this article will be concerned with the means for,
and obstacles to, according the juvenile legal controls over adverse in-
formation about him that may be collected and disseminated.
85 When a young person is defined as being delinquent by society, he is far more
likely to act in aggressive and antisocial ways. When his arrest record blocks his
future employment in legitimate activities .... it is quite likely that today's
delinquent will become tomorrow's adult criminal.
JOINT COI.M. ON MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN, REPORT: CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH:
CHALLENGE FOR THE 1970's 376 (1970).
It is not only the juvenile's self-concept that is altered by the dissemination of
seemingly objective records. One study demonstrated that teacher expectations based
even on false information profoundly modify student performance, even on standardized
comprehensive tests. R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLAssROOM (1968).
86 Drinan, Aftermath of Apprehension: A Family Lawyer's Response, 3 PRospEcrus
82-34 (1969). The parents of a minor, however, may possess the right to compel dis-
closure of records on their child. For example, in New York the parents of a school child
have the right to inspect his entire school record. Dachs v. Board of Educ., 53 Misc. 2d
13, 277 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Van Allen v. McCleary, 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d
501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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A. Reforming the Sentencing Process
Under the standard "bifurcated hearing" procedure, proceedings in
which a juvenile has been adjudicated a delinquent or a "person in need
of supervision" are customarily adjourned in favor of a subsequent
dispositional hearing. At that hearing the probation officer will submit
an extensive report and all interested parties may, and regularly do,
offer information bearing on the case. Many experienced juvenile
court attorneys believe that the conduct of the dispositional hearing and
the information tendered at it are far more determinative of disposition
than the nature of the precipitating offense. Because of the serious at-
tempt to achieve truly individualized sentencing in the juvenile justice
system, the juvenile court judge is confronted with a considerably wider
range of data than that which is included in the normal presentence
report employed in the adult criminal system.87 Because the juvenile
court needs to know more about the defendant, there is a heightened
vulnerability, and the court is apt to rely more heavily on speculative
records such as Y.D. reports.
It would seem an obviously justiciable injury that a youth might be
denied probationary status or have his sentence determined upon the
basis of inaccurate, misleading, or simply unverified accusations. No
important state interest can be said to underlie the memorialization and
use of records which offer little assurance of accuracy. Two remedies for
this apparent due process violation seem possible: (1) the defendant
might be given the right through counsel to challenge and supplement
adverse information presented at sentencing; or (2) per se exclusionary
rules could be formulated to bar the receipt of, or even to expunge,
particular kinds of data such as that commonly recorded on the Y.D.
card. These remedies, however, have not yet been accepted. The courts,
including the Supreme Court, have consistently refused to curtail the
sentencing judge's discretion. A brief review of the cases is necessary to
understand the context within which the search for remedies must
operate.
87 The best recent study on sentencing procedures is the American Bar Foundation's
survey of the administration of criminal justice, Sentencing: The Decision as to Type,
Length, and Conditions of Sentence, prepared by Professor Robert 0. Dawson. The study
concludes that little knowledge exists about administrative procedures designed to assure
the accuracy of presentence reports and less of their efficacy. SmmcN 5-6; cf. D.
NEWMAN, supra note 10, at 15. In New York family courts, as in the federal courts, dis-
closure of the presentence report to defense counsel prior to sentencing is a matter of




1. Judicial Discretion and the "Modern" View of Sentencing
More than twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court
recognized in Townsend v. Burke88 that misreading a defendant's past
criminal record could amount to a violation of due process of law.89
Cases applying this principle, however, have usually involved egregious
blunders on the part of the sentencing judge, and the principle is reg-
ularly qualified by the caveat that a court possesses wide discretion to
"predicate sentence on habitual misconduct, whether or not it resulted
in convictions."90 Thus limited, the few cases that have granted relief
based on a judge's erroneous interpretation of a defendant's past crim-
inal record represent only a modest inroad upon the general appellate
rule of nonreview of sentencing decisions.91
Behind this judicial passivism lies, in part, simple ignorance.
Appellate courts have either not understood how sentencing informa-
tion is acquired or they have conceived the sentencing process to be
basically ministerial, dealing with only "privileges" and not "rights." 9
2
A more fundamental obstacle to judicial reform of sentencing, however,
has been the fear that courts might be forced to apply all of the rigid
rules of the trial process to sentencing. For decades, all attempts to re-
form the sentencing process have been rejected with the argument that
any limitation of the trial judge's discretion would hopelessly burden
the criminal process, and could even result in greater injustice to the
accused, because the rules of evidence might also foreclose the con-
sideration of redeeming information. According to this argument forma-
lization of the sentencing process might force courts to revert to
standardized sentences. Although the reasoning involved is often less
than lucid, the conclusion is invariably reached that any significant
reform of sentencing would result in the sacrifice of rehabilitative ideals.
The foremost example of this argument is the Supreme Court's
88 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (reversing a state court sentence where the trial judge confused
arrests with convictions and read his mistake into the record).
89 Id. at 740-41.
90 E.g., United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970). The Second
Circuit in Malcolm expanded the Townsend holding into the following proposition:
"Misinformation or misunderstanding that is materially untrue regarding a prior criminal
record, or material false assumptions as to any facts relevant to sentencing, renders the
entire sentencing procedure invalid as a violation of due process." Id. The court added,
however, that other "aggravating circumstances" were present, namely that a plea bargain
made by the prosecution had been ignored by the judge. Id. at 816-19.
91 See Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
92 SENTENCING xxi. Today the right-privilege dichotomy has been thoroughly dis-
credited. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969). In Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the majority decision suggested that a concept of "entitlement"
should replace the old distinction. Id. at 262 n.8.
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decision in the landmark case of Williams v. New York. 93 In Williams
a convicted murderer was sentenced to death, despite the jury's recom-
mendation for leniency, because of the sentencing judge's explicit
reliance on portions of a presentence report which were never disclosed
to the defense, and which stated that the defendant had been "identified
as the perpetrator" of some thirty other crimes. At first blush, the case
would seem to be controlled by Townsend, decided earlier that same
yearY4 Speaking for the Court, however, Justice Black saw the de-
fendant's objections as threatening to confine the sentencing judge
within the narrow boundaries of the common law rules of evidence.95
The Court praised the idea of flexible sentences geared to rehabilitative
purposes and assumed, with little justification, that if strict rules of
evidence were made applicable, redeeming information would have to
be excluded in the same manner as damaging information.
93 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), in which
the state's attorney was permitted to make an extensive address to the sentencing judge
regarding the defendant's cruelty, citing matters not in evidence, resulting in the
imposition of capital punishment.
94 Although the facts are similar, these cases are distinguishable in three respects. First,
in Williams v. New York the defendant was represented by counsel at the sentencing proceed-
ings and his attorney made a statement in his behalf. Second, the accuracy of the in-
formation contained in the investigation report was not formally challenged at sentencing.
Finally, the judge did not mistakenly believe that defendant had actually been
convicted of the 30 other crimes although he "had information" that the defendant had
confessed to some and had been identified in others. 377 U.S. at 244-45.
95 Referring to the report, Justice Black said: "To deprive sentencing judges of
this kind of information would undermine modem penological procedural policies ....
Id. at 249-50.
Because defense counsel failed to object at sentencing to the use of the presentence
report, the exact scope of the Williams holding has long been debated. On appeal
defense counsel were forced to stress the confrontation clause argument that cross-
examination should be allowed before any sentencing data could be reported to the
judge. This proved too much for the Court to accept. Subsequently, several writers have
argued that the Williams holding applies only where counsel has failed to demand in-
spection of the sentencing report, and that when such demand is made Williams does
not prevent the assertion of a due process right to review and supplement the informa-
tion. See, e.g., Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEXAs L. REtv. 1 (1968). However, as the author notes, the Ad-
visory Committee Note to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (which
Rule gives the defendant the old common law right of "allocution," the right to present
mitigating information to the sentencing judge) interprets Williams more broadly. "It
is not a denial of due process of law for a court in sentencing to rely on a report of
pre-sentence investigation without disclosing such report to the defendant or giving him
an opportunity to rebut it." Id. at 13.
This interpretation of Williams seems to suggest that the defendant's sentencing
rights do not go beyond addressing a few remarks to the bench. In addition, courts have
regularly noted that Rule 32 places no limit on the relevancy of the information ten-
dered. See United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
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Although the decision raised the spectre of endless procedural
hearings and of a return to totally standardized sentencing, it never
explained clearly why a formal hearing is needed to dismiss information
which borders on idle gossip. Nor did it consider the possibility raised
recently by such decisions as Goldberg v. Kelly"8 that an informal hear-
ing would suffice.97 Moreover, Williams fails to distinguish between the
scope of the information received and its reliability, assuming appar-
ently that the necessity for a wide range of information justifies a
permissive attitude towards its accuracy as well. Similarly, the argument
that the rules of evidence are too burdensome disregards the possibility
that other rules could be fashioned which could feasibly regulate the
type of information allowed to be tendered at sentencing. Thus, for
instance, a firm rule that police prearrest records may not be tendered
would present no procedural problem for the trial court.
As vulnerable to criticism as Williams is, however, it has been
repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court and followed by lower
courts.98 Additionally, the juvenile sentencing process would seem to be
doubly insulated by the Supreme Court's isolation of juvenile ad-
judicatory proceedings as the sole focus of its concern.99 But the precise
holding of Williams is still subject to some doubt. Does it reject only the
assertion that hearsay can never be received, or does it really constitute a
justiciability decision to the effect that the entire area of sentencing can-
not be subjected to due process standards? If Williams can be construed
simply to reject the imposition of the impossible procedural burden of
requiring the court to hear formal evidence as to the appropriate sen-
tence and to allow confrontation and cross-examination, then it would
not pose an obstacle to rules which focus on records themselves. Such
rules might uniformly proscribe the admission of specified data of
insufficient relevance or reliability in individual sentencing proceedings
and thus avoid ensnarling the trial court in procedural technicalities.
A recent Supreme Court reference to Williams emphasized its
96 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
97 In Goldberg, which required a pretermination hearing for AFDC (Aid to Families
with Dependent Children) recipients, the Court noted: "Informal procedures will suffice;
in this context due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of
offering evidence." Id. at 269.
98 See Specht v. Patterson, 886 U.S. 605 (1967); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576
(1959); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Fischer,
381 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968). In Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424 (1962), the Supreme Court suggested that its power to review sentencing
procedures is derived from its supervisory power over the lower federal courts, and not
from the Constitution.
99 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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narrower interpretation that the sentencing judge need not conduct a
formal hearing. 00 In addition, the Fourth Circuit recently required the
sentencing judge to disclose to the defendant those portions of a pre-
sentence report which dealt with his criminal record, apparently on the
theory that inaccuracies in this area can be quickly rebutted by the de-
fendant and that such disclosure will not necessitate revealing con-
fidential police sources of information.' 0 '
Adding further support to a narrow interpretation of Williams are
two recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with analogous situations.
In both cases the Court subjected hearings to due process standards. In
Mempa v. Rhay,10 2 the Court ruled unanimously that counsel must be
provided at probation revocation hearings where the defendant had
initially received a suspended sentence. Lower courts following Mempa
have interpreted it as a rejection of the once popular view that sentenc-
ing is primarily a matter immune from intrusion by appellate courts. 03
Of more significance is the Court's decision in Kent v. United States,104
where it ordered not only that counsel be permitted to appear at waiver
100 We held in Williams v. New York ... that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require a judge to have hearings and to give a
convicted person an opportunity to participate in those hearings when he came
to determine the sentence to be imposed.
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967).
101 Baker v. United States, 888 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968).
102 389 U.S. 128 (1967). The decision is susceptible to restrictive interpretation. Jus-
tice Marshall emphasized the defenses that would be waived under state law if counsel
were not present to assert them at sentencing. In addition, a suspicion of plea bargaining
pervades the decision. New York courts have extended the decision's applicability to
the revocation of a juvenile's parole. See People ex rel. "F" v. Hill, 29 N.Y.2d 17, 271
N.E.2d 911, 323 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1971).
103 In Hester v. Craven, 322 F. Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1971), a federal district court
rejected the argument that a defendant given an indeterminate sentence could have
his parole revoked without a due process hearing where sentence was redetermined at
the parole revocation proceeding:
It has been suggested by the respondent that the decision to redetermine
(the sentence) is prognostic and since it is based upon subjective factors involv-
ing such intangibles as the extent of the petitioner's rehabilitation and his
ability to get along in society, the procedure ought not to be subject to due
process requirements. This view of the redetermination procedure is inconsistent
with the facts of this case.
Id. at 1264. See Dunn v. California Dep't of Corrections, 401 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968);
In re McLain, 55 Cal.2d 78, 357 P.2d 1080, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1960), cert. denied, 368 US.
10 (1961).
104 383 US. 541 (1966). A further decision of importance is Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966), in which the Court held that an inmate confined in a mental institution
must be given a full civil commitment hearing if he is to be held beyond the expiration
of his criminal sentence. In United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969), the Second Circuit extended the civil hearing require-
ment to all transfers of prisoners to mental institutions.
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hearings (the proceedings by which juveniles accused of serious crimes
are transferred to the adult criminal process), but also that counsel be
allowed to view and challenge the probation file the judge would
examine. Without mentioning Williams the Court rejected the idea that
the role of counsel should be limited simply to the presentation of re-
deeming information about the juvenile:
[I]f the staff's submissions include materials which are susceptible
to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to
"denigrate" such matter. There is no irrebuttable presumption of
accuracy attached to staff reports. ... [1]t is equally of "critical
importance" that the material submitted to the judge... be sub-
jected, within reasonable limits having regard to the theory of the
Juvenile Court Act, to examination, criticism and refutation.105
The ease with which Kent reached a result so contrary to Williams
seems best explained by the Court's reference to the "theory of the
Juvenile Court Act."'10 6 Kent's holding may thus be based on statutory
interpretation rather than on constitutional considerations. 107 In any
event, no court has yet extended Kent beyond waiver hearings to the
dispositional stage. Indeed, the Uniform Juvenile Court Act05 expressly
permits the receipt of hearsay testimony at the dispositional hearing.109
Yet neither the Kent nor the Mempa rationale can be meaningfully
confined to the limited situations of probation revocation and waiver
hearings.
Even apart from Kent, legislative revisions of the Juvenile Court
Act in some states have given defense counsel the right to examine the
probation file and even to cross-examine witnesses.110 The Model Rules
for Juvenile Courts have gone even further, requiring the probation
105 383 U.S. at 563. In Kent, however, the Court also stated unequivocally that a
juvenile court may receive "ex parte analyses" from its staff, even though "secret infor-
mation" in a youth's social reports could not be relied upon. Id. The Court emphasized
that an informal proceeding would suffice.
106 Id. at 554-55. Both Kent and Mempa are also distinguishable from Williams in
that waiver and probation revocation proceedings are much less frequent than ordinary
sentencing proceedings, and thus can more conveniently implement procedural guarantees.
107 By construing the District of Columbia juvenile Court Act, which requires a
"full investigation" at a waiver hearing and authorizes persons having a "legitimate
interest" to obtain access to the juvenile's social records (id. at 561-63), the Court found
that the statute authorized some "adversarial tactics" at the waiver stage.
108 UNIFORM JUV. CT. ACT § 29(d), in NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMW'RS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws, HANDBOOK 267 (1968).
109 Id.; cf. N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Act § 745 (McKinney 1963), which stipulates that only
information that is "material and relevant" can be admitted at a dispositional hearing.
110 Revisions in the juvenile Court Rules of Maryland (MD. Juv. Cr. R. 913, § a(2)
(Supp. 1971)) and Washington (WAsH. Juv. CT. R. 5.2(b) (Supp. 1971)), and statutory
change in Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.161(2) (1971)), require disclosure.
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officer to defend his investigation and recommendations from the
witness stand."' In New York, where disclosure of the presentence re-
port to defense counsel is still discretionary, a leading family court
judge has indicated that she may, under certain circumstances, require
even psychiatric evaluations to be subjected to cross-examination. 11 In
short, notwithstanding Willams, procedures at the dispositional stage of
the juvenile court evidence an evolving adversarial remedy.
The critical issue, however, is whether such a change will in reality
protect juveniles from the introduction of unreliable data.113 For
several reasons the adversarial approach, dependent as it is on disclosure
to defense counsel, appears inadequate. The basic deficiency of an ad-
versarial remedy, apart from the time-consuming burdens it imposes, is
the inability of the juvenile's counsel to rebut fully the inferences
created by a misleading record. At best, a probation officer through
cross-examination might be made to admit his unfamiliarity with the
data he is reciting. An ineffectual pro forma objection in most instances
will be the defense counsel's only counter to the introduction of mis-
leading records. In the final analysis, disclosure to defense counsel for
impeachment purposes can be considered an effective remedy only if we
postulate the most impartial of judges and the most zealous of defense
counsels. The exclusion of police records should not depend upon the
ability of the individual attorney to convince the individual judge that
particular records are unreliable. The remedy that Kent presages-an
individual voir dire over each piece of information tendered-is both
cumbersome and insufficient: the prejudice created by misleading rec-
111 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRimE & DELINQUENCY, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS,
R. 30 (1969) and W. SHMuAN, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS (HEW 1966)
propose that the probation officer defend his investigation and recommendations from
the stand. Similarly, a proposed draft of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure has been submitted which would generally make presentence reports available.
PROPOSED AM nMN T THE FEDRAL RULES OF ClimiNAL PROCEDURE 62-67 (Prelim.
Draft 1970).
112 In re Baine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 256-57, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359, 867 (Queens County Farn.
Ct. 1967).
113 The standard rebuttal to the advocates of disclosure to defense counsel is that
revealing the sources of the probation department's information will "dry them up,"
by subjecting them to reprisals. See SENTENCING 27. This article has not attempted to
analyze such arguments because it finds the remedy of disclosure to defense counsel it-
self inadequate to protect the defendant's rights. In any event, it is clear that police
records, unlike unrevealed sources, will not "dry up." For a general discussion of the
disclosure issue, see Note, Disclosure of Social and Psychological Reports, 7 OSCooDE
HALL L.J. 213 (1969). On the federal level, disclosure of presentence reports is within the
discretion of the trial court under Fm. R. Cluzi. P. 32(e). United States v. Fischer, 381
F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968).
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ords cannot be overcome simply by their disclosure to defense counsel,
especially if they are not even subjected to cross-examination. M4
2. Beyond Disclosure: The Need for Per Se Rules
A more satisfactory alternative to disclosure is the development of
procedures for the expungement or, at least, the quarantine of certain
classes of records. Though expungement, insofar as it does not involve
the sentencing judge, might prevent the problems Williams sought to
avoid, it faces formidable and ancient obstacles.
As a general rule arrest records have been cognizable in sentencing
despite the absence of conviction."15 Juvenile prearrest records are, of
course, distinguishable from arrest records on a number of grounds: (1)
a major state interest served by the preservation of arrest records is ab-
sent in the case of juvenile prearrest records since identification data-
fingerprints and photographs-are not included; (2) since no official
arrest has been made there is considerably less assurance that the stand-
ard of "probable cause" supports the record's accusations; (3) the police
contact reported need not involve the violation of a criminal statute
since only the vague standard of "misconduct" limits what the police
officer may report; and (4) the failure to make the arrest in the original
instance contradicts any subsequent claim as to the value and validity of
prearrest data. Real as such distinctions are, they do not imply reasons
for the maintenance and dissemination of arrest records when no con-
viction occurs. The use of both arrest and prearrest records violates the
vaunted Anglo-American principle of presumed innocence. Accord-
ingly, a showing that the use of Y.D. records is even more irrational than
114 A committee of the American Bar Association has also recognized the need for
overall ground rules: "Arrests, juvenile dispositions short of an adjudication, and the
like, can be extremely misleading and damaging if presented to the court as part of
a section of the report which deals with past convictions." ABA PROJEor ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 2.3, at 37 (Tent.
Draft 1970), cited in Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 491 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
115 For a discussion of the controversy over the use of arrest records, see W. LAFAvE,
ARREST: Tim DECISION To TAXE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965); Hess & Le Poole, Abuse
of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRME & DELINQUENCY 494 (1967);
Schwartz & Skolnick, supra note 83; Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records,
56 CORNELL L. REv. 470 (1971). See also McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq. 341, 54
A.2d 469 (Ch. 1947) (holding that statute providing for fingerprinting and photographing
of persons arrested for indictable offenses did not constitute an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy); Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957) (holding that
the retention of photographs, fingerprints, and identification records by the city police
did not constitute an invasion of privacy). For an opposite result prohibiting the dis.
semination of rogues gallery portraits, see Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 89 So. 499
(1905).
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traditional arrest record practices may not persuade those who refuse in
the first instance to concede the injustice of the use of arrest records.
Recently, however, federal courts have expunged arrest records in a
series of unprecedented cases. A variety of justifications has been em-
ployed, ranging from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,116 to
the first amendment, to judicial discretion in certain situations.117 In
recent cases courts have expunged arrest records either immediately
after acquittal or even years later when plaintiff was able to demonstrate
that "probable cause" did not exist to support the arrest.1 8 In all these
116 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
117 In Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated and remanded,
401 U.S. 987 (1971), the court found North Carolina's vagrancy statute unconstitutional
and ordered expungement of arrest records of plaintiffs who belonged to a hippie com-
mune which was repeatedly subjected to police raids. The court's analysis of the limited
utility of police records is particularly interesting:
Arrest records exist to facilitate criminal investigation, but the plaintiffs' rec-
ords here perform no such function. Plaintiffs have committed no crimes, and re-
tention of their arrest records cannot be justified as a "criminal identification."
The existence of the records could harm plaintiffs unfairly, and this possibil-
ity suggests expunction where criminal investigation is not subserved in the least
by retention of the files.... [O]n the facts of this case, including the youth of
the plaintiffs, their innocence of any crime, the extreme misbehavior of the police
in making arrests without probable cause, and the absence of any benefit to so-
ciety .... we think expunction should be allowed.
Id. at 65-66 (emphasis added). Although this decision has been reversed in part by the
Supreme Court (401 U.S. 987 (1971)) and remanded for "reconsideration in light of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)," it would appear that the reversal does not affect
the expungement aspect of the case, but rather only the voiding of the North Carolina
vagrancy statute. To the same effect see Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa.
1968). In United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967), a youth charged with
draft evasion offered to enlist and the charges against him were dropped. The defendant
then motioned the court to expunge his arrest record. The court did so in order that he
not be "haunted" by the record. It added in an even broader statement than that of the
Wheeler court: "[W]hen an accused is acquitted of the crime or when he is discharged
without conviction, no public good is accomplished by retention of criminal identifica-
tion records." Id. at 970. In United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967), the
court ordered expungement of all arrest and conviction records of civil rights workers.
118 In Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the
District of Columbia Circuit Court summarized at length the injuries caused by retention
of arrest records in upholding a lower criminal court judge's decision to expunge the
record in a case where the evidence was particularly weak. Several state cases are also
worthy of note. In In re Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (N.Y. City Fain. Ct.
1970), New York family court Judge Nanette Dembitz discussed in remarkable detail the
injuries to a New York juvenile when an arrest record is preserved. Apart from consti-
tutional considerations, she found the legislative intent of the Family Court Act to re-
quire expungement. Id. at 204-05, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 624. In Henry v. Looney, 65 Misc. 2d
759, 317 N.Y.S.Rd 848 (Sup. Ct. 1971), a New York supreme court expunged a juvenile's
arrest record (at least to the extent of ordering the obliteration of his surname from the
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cases, however, expungement has occurred on an ad hoc basis with the
plaintiff seemingly required to prove his innocence.119
In the most important of the expungement cases, Menard v.
Mitchell, 20 the District of Columbia Circuit took the first step towards
a general statement of the individual's right to prevent the adverse use
of information stemming from his contacts with the police.' 2' The facts
of Menard are simple. Dale Menard was arrested in California and
released two days later without being formally charged. Subsequently,
he discovered that his fingerprints and a summary of the incident were
on file with the FBI. Since a California statute characterized the contact
as a "detention" rather than an arrest, he sued to expunge his record on
the theory that the FBI had authority to maintain only criminal rec-
ords. The court of appeals dealt only summarily with this point of
statutory interpretation and focused instead on the absence of informa-
tion in the record upon which to determine if probable cause for arrest
had existed. It held neither side was entitled to summary judgment and
remanded for a further hearing. In dictum, the court considered the
problem of an arrest based upon possible cause followed by exoneration.
"[I]f the FBI has actual knowledge that further investigation exonerated
appellant, it may be under a duty at the very least to supplement its files
record and enjoining its dissemination in any form), after deciding that the record was
"logically probative" of nothing. The court, however, first made extensive findings as to
the evidence underlying the arrest in order to determine the absence of probable cause.
Similarly, in Irani v. District of Columbia, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. App. 1971), a District of
Columbia appellate court reversed a lower court and ordered it to exercise discretion
and, if appropriate, to expunge a student's arrest record where the student was able to
demonstrate that he had in no way been involved in a protest march which resulted in
mass arrests. In these cases the plaintiffs were able to make a strong showing of inno-
cence. It is not clear whether the same courts would expunge the arrest record of an
unconvicted defendant against whom circumstantial evidence existed.
119 But cf. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), where
Litton Industries was enjoined by a federal district court from soliciting, obtaining, or
considering arrest records in the recruitment of personnel on the theory that the dispropor-
tionate number of arrests experienced by Negroes made consideration of these records
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)). Alone, Gregory
seems to stand for the proposition that arrest records are per se unreliable. Gregory has
been ably discussed in a recent article, Note, Arrests as a Racially Discriminatory Em.
ployment Criterion, 6 HAWv. Crv. RiGos-Civ. Lm. L. Raw. 165 (1970) which deals with
the unique problems of Title VII litigation. Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1971, at 36, col. 5,
noting the commencement of operation of the FBI's computerized criminal history data
bank that will eventually give law enforcement agencies access to arrest records from
any state and from federal investigative agencies.
120 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
121 But see Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966),
where the Seventh Circuit in a terse and uninformative opinion concluded that a demand
for expungement did not state a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Statute (42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
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to indicate that fact.'' 12 2 The court qualified this rule by recognizing that
substantial discretion existed in the agency to determine how detailed
its criminal identification files would be, but added that the extent of
that discretion depended in turn upon "the extent to which the informa-
tion may be disseminated."
123
Menard, strictly construed, insists only upon correction of a record
known to be erroneous.1 24 But the decision's rationale has broader
implications. Chief Judge Bazelon indicated that arrest records are per
se misleading where no conviction ensues and that full scale expunge-
ment might be necessary.125 In addition, Menard's central concept of a
"right to amplification" measured by the extent of dissemination of the
record goes to the heart of the issue much more directly than does
Kent's reasoning.
On remand District Judge Gesell found that the ultimate disposi-
tion of the individual whose arrest records were disseminated by the FBI
seldom became known to the recipient, and that the FBI could not
independently determine the accuracy or reliability of the data it was
handling. Avoiding the constitutional issue,126 he narrowly interpreted
the statute granting the Attorney General authority to collect and
classify criminal identification records as precluding the dissemination
of arrest records by the FBI "for employment, licensing or related pur-
122 430 F.2d at 492 (emphasis added). Menard did not involve the situation of an
arrest followed by an acquittal. The court does, however, speak of "assumptions regard-
ing the meaning of an arrest" which unfairly prejudice the accused where the arrest
lacks "probable cause." Id. at 491-92. Turning to the case of a legal arrest followed by
exoneration (through further investigation, not through acquittal), the court suggests
that the plaintiff may possess "a right to limit [the record's] dissemination or to require
its amplification." Id. at 491-93. The court did not consider the arrest followed by neither
exoneration nor conviction, but adjustment, i.e., the typical juvenile situation. Here am-
plification of the record to the extent of recording the disposition would only enhance
the distorted inference of guilt; restricting dissemination appears to be the only adequate
way to protect a youth.
123 Id. at 492.
124 This principle alone would seriously undermine Y.D. reports because no proce-
dure exists for modification or expungement even if the report is determined to be
"unfounded."
125 "The only adequate remedy may lie either in severely curtailing any use of
records of arrest, or in eliminating altogether their maintenance in a file associated with
the individual's name." 430 F.2d at 495 n.51.
126 [A]ccusations not proven, charges made without adequate supporting evidence
when tested by the judicial process, ancient or juvenile transgressions long since
expiated by responsible conduct, should not be indiscriminately broadcast under
governmental auspices. . . Systematic recordation and dissemination of infor-
mation about individual citizens is a form of surveillance and control which may
easily inhibit freedom to speak, to work, and to move about in this land.
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 725-26 (D.D.C. 1971) (emphasis added).
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
poses.' 27 At the same time, however, he refused to expunge plaintiff's
arrest record "where its dissemination outside the Federal Government
is limited to law enforcement purposes."'12 Two things are immediately
significant about Judge Gesell's opinion: (1) it does not look to the
evidence of plaintiff's guilt or innocence, but rather to the incomplete
and uncertain character of the data; and (2) it creates an extremely
ambiguous exception to its overall rule of no access-that of "law en-
forcement purposes." Exactly what is the scope of "law enforcement
purposes"? For example, can the data disseminated by the FBI be used
in a presentence report prepared in a state different from that of the
original arrest, even though it is known that the record may be incom-
plete or distorted?u 9 Is it available for use in the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion? Whether the court simply ignores such problems or
whether it would rely on a right-privilege distinction to deny that a de-
fendant is entitled to record accuracy is not clear. What is dear, how-
ever, is a disparity between the evident judicial concern for the
economic injury caused by an arrest record and the court's insensitivity
to the possibility of prejudice from the same inaccurate data should the
defendant reappear in the criminal justice system.
The reluctance to provide for expungement in sentencing is
evidenced in cases where the defendant has sought to exclude illegally
seized evidence when offered at sentencing. In United States v. Schi.
pani 30 the Second Circuit, relying heavily on the rationale of Williams,
held that the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule does not extend to
sentencing, and that illegally seized evidence might be offered in the
interest of providing the sentencing judge with the maximum amount of
127 Id. at 727.
128 Id.
129 If there actually has been an acquittal and this is not shown in the record (and
the presentence report was not disclosed to defendant), it seems likely that Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra) should apply (if
somehow defendant learned of the mistake).
130 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
A sentencing judge's access to information should be almost completely un-
fettered in order that he may "acquire a thorough acquaintance with the charac-
ter and history of the man before [him]." . ..
This policy permits the broad acceptance of hearsay in the sentencing proce-
dure.
Id. at 27, quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 843 (1965) (brackets in original). Cf. Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971) (exclusionary rule applied to illegally seized
evidence which had been specifically seized to influence sentence). Whether or not the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule should extend to sentencing is a question beyond
the scope of this article, except insofar as the issues of reliability and relevance of ten-
dered arrest records are raised.
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information. Schipani does contain, however, two important caveats:
(1) the illegally seized evidence must not have been "gathered for the
express purpose of improperly influencing the sentencing judge" and
(2) the evidence must be "reliable."'181 Although the court failed to
examine the difficulties involved in the sentencing judge's determination
of whether the information tendered is reliable, reliability is at least
acknowledged as a limit upon the sentencing court's discretion.
3 2
Until recently, discussion of the likelihood and probable direction
of sentencing reform would stop at this point. Little more could be
said than that arrest records cases, although offering possible avenues for
the expansion of the embryonic principle of Townsend that a defen-
dant should not be sentenced on inaccurate information, were more
concerned with economic injuries than with the greater peril to a de-
fendant who reappears in the criminal justice system.13  Today, how-
ever, the activism of the Ninth Circuit in two recent cases has changed
this picture.
In the first of these cases, Tucker v. United States,134 the Ninth
Circuit held that resentencing was required when the sentencing judge
considered uncounseled convictions obtained before Gideon v. Wain-
wright 35 The decision relies on the Supreme Court's language in Bur-
gett v. Texas'16 that uncounseled convictions may not be "used against
a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another
offense ... .,u17 Burgett, however, involved a case where the criminal
act (violation of a recidivist statute) required a prior conviction as an
element of the offense. Thus Tucker was an extension of Burgett in-
sofar as it holds that certain information must acually be excluded from
the sentencing process. The distinction is important since Tucker, so
construed, fashions a per se sentencing rule and embraces exactly the ex-
131 435 F.2d at 28.
132 In the case of juvenile records, the "improper influence" limitation may be more
significant, since records such as the Y.D. card appear to be gathered and maintained for
the particular purpose of "building a record." See notes 20-26 and accompanying text
supia.
133 Several state courts and legislatures, however, have recently increased either the
defendant's access to, or his right to cross-examination of, presentence reports. See Kuh,
For a Meaningful Right to Counsel on Sentencing, 57 A.B.A.J. 1096 (1971). Federal
courts, except for the Ninth Circuit, have been generally recalcitrant. See United States
v. Bakewell, 430 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970); United States v.
Holder, 412 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1969).
134 431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970), af'd, 92 S. Ct. 589 (1972).
135 372 US. 335 (1963).
'36 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
137 Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
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clusionary approach which Schipani rejected with regard to illegally
seized evidence.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed,188 citing both Townsend
and Williams, and reconciling them in the following words: "[W]e deal
here not with a sentence imposed in the informed discretion of a trial
judge, but with a sentence founded at least in part upon misinformation
of constitutional magnitude."'3 9 What misinformation is of constitu-
tional magnitude appears to have become the issue. Here Tucker is
ambiguous. On the one hand it suggests that only materially false as-
sumptions about an individual's criminal record will suffice. 140 Else-
where it refers to "factual circumstances of the respondent's background
[which] would have appeared in a dramatically different light at the
sentencing proceeding."' 41 Such language suggests that any form of
material misinformation could be of constitutional magnitude.
While the case can be strictly construed as simply an extension of
Gideon v. Wainwright,142 a persuasive argument might be made that
Tucker requires the exclusion of arrest records in sentencing since the
record of an uncounseled conviction certainly possesses no less pro-
bative value than the record of a mere arrest.
To date the Supreme Court has never directly faced the issue of
expunging arrest records although it has, in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners,14 required the admission to the Bar of an applicant with a
record of arrests. In doing so it unequivocally rejected the probative
value of arrest records: "The mere fact that a man has been arrested
has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged
in any misconduct."' 4  It is possible, of course, to distinguish the situ-
ation of an applicant to the Bar from that of a defendant facing sentence.
Yet such a distinction is irrelevant to the question of the probative value
of arrest records. Moreover, involving as it often does probable differ-
ences of class and race, such a distinction seems highly unfortunate.
The presumption of innocence should be distributed equally.
Another Ninth Circuit case decided before the Supreme Court's
affirmance in Tucker further limits the information a sentencing judge
may consider. In United States v. Weston,145 a defendant convicted of
138 United States v. Tucker, 92 S. Ct. 589 (1972).
139 Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 592.
141 Id.
142 Tucker concludes by stating that the Court will not permit "[e]rosion of the
Gideon principle." Id. at 593.
143 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
144 Id. at 241.
145 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).
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possession of marijuana had been given a maximum twenty-year sen-
tence based upon the unsworn testimony of an anonymous informer
who identified the defendant as a principal West Coast drug supplier.
Noting that such information could not have supported even an arrest
warrant but that it had apparently multiplied the length of the sen-
tence, the court stated: "To us, there is something radically wrong with
a system of justice that can produce such a result. The problem is what,
if anything, can be done about it."'146 The cause of the "problem," of
course, was Williams v. New York. 147 After struggling with Williams at
length, the court distinguished it by utilizing an exclusionary analysis
very similar to that suggested here. In Williams, it said, appellant un-
successfully attacked two procedures employed at sentencing: the receipt
of hearsay and the lack of due process safeguards. In contrast, at issue in
Weston was the accuracy of information. Upon this distinction the
court rested its decision to give relief: "There is a difference between
reviewing a sentence and deciding that certain types of information
should not, for various reasons, be considered in sentencing."148 Weston
then appears to formulate a per se exclusionary rule regarding unveri-
fied reports of anonymous informers. But more important is the de-
cision's methodology. Henceforth sentencing data will apparently be
susceptible to classification on the basis of reliability, with appellate
courts determining if the information is sufficiently unsubstantiated so
that it should have been excluded at sentencing. Such an approach may
well be "an end run around Williams v. New York,"'149 but given time
it could generate an urgently needed body of case law governing the
character of information upon which a man may be committed to
prison. Without such rules, as the Weston court noted, there is some-
thing radically wrong with any system of justice.
B. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has been defined as "control over knowledge
about oneself."1 0 The juvenile's situation, however, involves unique
privacy problems. In the case of the juvenile it is not simply the usual
array of potential employers, creditors, salesmen, and the like who
seek data, but rather a number of specialized institutions and agencies
146 Id. at 631.
147 377 U.S. 241 (1949); see notes 93-101 and accompanying text supra.
148 448 F.2d at 631.
149 Id. at 634.
18o Fried, Privacy, 77 YALR L.J. 475, 483 (1968). For a nearly identical definition,
see A. WrSTN, PRivAc, AND FREiEoM 7 (1967): "the claim of individuals, groups, or institu-
tions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others."
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which are authorized by law to make certain determinations for him
in his own "best interest." Included among these questionably "benev-
olent" agencies, are the youth division of the police department or the
probation department, the school system, and the welfare department.
At present, to deny the request of one of these agencies for information
is often to risk the loss of important benefits. For example, in the case
of Y.D. reports, a refusal to give information or to cooperate with "ad-
justment" efforts could result in court referral. Ultimately the juve-
nile's denial of certain information to these agencies is a daim for
partial autonomy-for greater freedom from the state's parens patriae
authority. If this is true, then "the right to be let alone," as Justice
Brandeis termed the right of privacy,151 is therefore antithetical to and
in a sense subversive of the premises upon which a great number of
institutions dealing with juveniles operate, including the underlying
idea of juvenile law that the juvenile is not sufficiently mature to de-
serve full constitutional rights.15" 2
The concept of delayed entitlement to constitutional rights should
be inapplicable to a juvenile's claim of privacy; rather, the concern
should be with the juvenile's often relatively greater need for privacy.
Studies have indicated that the practice of close state surveillance is
self-defeating; the more a juvenile is observed and his conduct noted,
the greater the possibility of antisocial conduct.-53 Some degree of
privacy, even apart from the constitutional arguments, seems to be es-
sential to "normal" development; an unremitting search for juvenile
misconduct only obstructs social goals. Moreover, the idea of a "right
to a fresh start" has long been central to American society.lns The
151 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
152 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US. 629 (1968), especially the concurring opinion
of Justice Stewart characterizing the juvenile as "not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Id.
at 649-50.
Conversely, recent cases dealing with the right of the student to maintain a personal
appearance of which the school disapproves, have largely concluded that the juvenile's
choice is constitutionally protected, at least where no compelling need for conformity is
shown. Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); Richards v. Thurston,
304 F. Supp. 449, 451 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1970); Breen v. Kahl, 296
F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937
(1970); cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
153 See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
1r4 Americans throughout their history have accepted as a central pillar of their
national mythology the notion of the second opportunity. Just as it is assumed
that all men ought to be equal in their opportunities, so it has been .. . be-
lieved that every man, however outrageous or disreputable his past, should be
permitted a second start. The origins of the doctrine presumably may be traced
to the character and practical requirements first of the earliest settlements and
later of frontier life. The repentant ne'er-do-well might go to America, to the
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crucial question is what limitations on data gathering, maintenance,
and dissemination are desirable. 155 There are a number of considera-
tions upon which such limitations may rationally be based.
1. The Scope of the Inquiry: Is the Data Functionally Relevant?
An obvious consideration limiting the scope of police records is a
functional one: the specific data recorded should be relevant to the
recording agency's responsibilities.' 0 The problem with such a limita-
tion is to determine exactly what are an agency's responsibilities towards
the juvenile. An example is the situation of one of the plaintiffs in
Cuevas who received a Y.D. report with regard to his status as an illegiti-
west or to the city, but he was always thought to have discarded the limitations
of his past. The hagiology of American history is populated largely by men who
overcame youthful indiscretions and settled into steady lives of unrelenting
respectability.
L. Lister, The Confidentiality of Pupils' School Records 69 (Russell Sage Foundation 1969)
(unpublished).
155 A considerable debate has surrounded the question of whether the right to
privacy should proceed from exegesis of the existing cases or from consideration of the
fundamental values involved. Dean William Prosser delineated four principal injuries which
the case law has made actionable: (1) the publication of information which places the
aggrieved in an incomplete light; (2) the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts;
(3) the intrusion upon a person's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; and
(4) the appropriation by another of a person's name or likeness. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAlF.
L. Ra,. 383, 389 (1960). Thus, as the first two listed injuries make dear, even under the
common law's narrow view of privacy, truth has not always been a complete defense.
See Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (4th Dist. 1931). Professors Edward Blou-
stein and Charles Fried in particular have criticized Prosser on his conservative approach
to the definition of privacy, See Bloustein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L Ray. 962 (1964); Fried, supra note 150, at 477.
If the concept of privacy as a protected right is derived simply from resort to the
tort law doctrines of defamation and invasion of privacy, two principal obstacles face the
potential plaintiff: (1) disclosure must be made to an extensive audience regardless of
the prejudicial character of the information; and (2) the doctrine of privilege will be
likely to protect the private investigator or the government body seeking information.
See Karst, supra note 68, at 347. But see York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 196a) (in
which dissemination of nude photographs solely within the police department was found
actionable).
Professor Arthur Miller has concluded that there is foundation in common law for
finding actionable (1) the dissemination of "evidence of present or past actions or associa-
tions to a wider audience than the subject consented to or anticipated" and (2) the
introduction of "factual or contextual inaccuracies that create an erroneous impression
of the subject's actual conduct or achievements in the minds of those to whom the
information is exposed." Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge
of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MiCH. L. Ray. 1089, 1109
(1969).
156 The only case in this area appears to be United States v. Rickenbacker, 309
F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963), upholding the validity of census




mate father. Youth Aid Division investigators subsequently made ex-
tended inquiries into his continuing relationship with the girl involved.
The purpose of the inquiry was unclear, but it appears to have been
motivated by a vague desire to "help the child." The police arguably
have responsibilities in such situations to notify appropriate social wel-
fare agencies. It hardly follows, however, that the incident should be
permanently memorialized.
Information about a juvenile's home life, affiliations, and welfare
status generally seem outside the proper concern of the police. Yet if
the position of the police vis- L-vis the juvenile is similiar to that of a
general welfare agency, then all data is potentially pertinent. To limit
the data which the police are allowed to record it is first necessary to
insist upon jurisdictional limits to their authority.
The President's Commission's recommendation that police au-
thorities should not attempt to exercise benevolent authority over
minors beyond referral to social welfare agencies suggests a possible
jurisdictional limit.1 57 The proper scope of police inquiry need not go
beyond the occasion which gave rise to the police-juvenile contact. Thus,
for example, police might justifiably ask a juvenile to explain his
presence near the scene of a crime, but not ask if he regularly attends
school.
Another consideration is whether an agency receiving reports of
police contacts can make meaningful use of reported data. Too often
the traditional technique (often referred to as* the "case attribute" ap-
proach) is to amass every available "fact" about an individual without
consideration of its relevance or reliability. The result may be a highly
nonrigorous, impressionistic methodology--one which does not ensure
the utility of the data collected. In questioning the wisdom of current
efforts at extensive data collection, penologist Donald Grant has shown
that judgments as to the likelihood of parole violations by potential
parolees, even when made by experienced administrators based upon
a reading of case histories, are less accurate than the results obtained by
random selection.'5"
The fundamental premise of the "case attribute" approach seems
to be that any fact is relevant: a youth's past sexual history, attitudes
147 CPfE COiM'N REPORT 82-83. The Commission has also recommended that
attempts at police questioning of minors be confined to "situations where there is ob-
jective, specifiable ground for suspicion." Id. at 79.
158 Grant, Various Uses of Prediction Procedures, in READINGS IN C~MUNOLOGY AND
PEzoLoGY 607, 608-10 (D. Dressler ed. 1964). See Schuessler, Parole Prediction: Its History
and Status, in id. at 598. Ironically, however, accurate prediction is possible with regard
to the behavior of parole boards. One study predicted with a high degree of accuracy
parole board decisions based on intake information. See Grant, supra at 611.
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towards teachers, political outlook, social affiliations-all are presumed
somehow to be of value. In a perfect system such data might be in-
telligently evaluated; but in our less than ideal reality this quest for
every detail is both damaging and senseless, because the recipient of the
information is not informed whether or not the characteristics recorded
distinguish the subject juvenile from other youths in the same environ-
ment who have not been apprehended for delinquency. For example,
in a ghetto neighborhood where eighty percent of the youths are truant
and dependent on welfare, but only ten percent are "delinquent," in-
clusion of truancy or welfare data in a police report prejudices a youth
without communicating a distinctive portrait of him. Thus the selection
of even objective facts may entail an unintended evaluative conclusion.
The recipient of such information naturally assumes that all facts
presented are material.
A better approach would be for the data collection agency to re-
cord only information that it believes will distinguish the individual
from his contemporaries. 159 At a minimum such an approach would
substitute deliberate discretion and interpretation for random impli-
cation. Compelling reasons support such curtailment of data collection.
Sociologist Stanton Wheeler has observed that, at present, the more a
juvenile court conducts presentence social study, the more likely it is
to send youths who come before it to institutions. 60 The danger is that
information in juvenile records may not be carefully evaluated but
rather the court may simply proceed on the assumption that the more
data, the higher the risk of probation.1 1
2. The Extent of Dissemination
Different agencies may give different interpretations to the same
"fact" in a juvenile report. Even among the agencies customarily dealing
with youths there exist profoundly different definitions of deviance. Data
159 See w. REcKLE, T-E CRIME PROBLEM 32-43 (1955).
6o Wheeler, Introduction to CONTROLLING DELiNQUENTs 1, 6 (S. Wheeler ed. 1968):
Juvenile crime rates are higher in communities with enlightened, professional
police departments than in those with more traditional police departments ....
... Judges who adopt the modern juvenile court philosophy appear to com-
mit more youth to institutions than do those operating with a more formal and
legalistic judicial view ....
161 This appears to be Grant's conclusion.
Correctional agencies, like other social agencies, have two main concerns: keep-
ing case records and making decisions. Both represent . . . expenditures of
time and money, but the two activities have little influence on each other. The
information-collectors are busy describing the whole person. The decision-makers
are busy trying to cope with a multitude of pressures in a field where little
systematic study or body of facts is available.
Grant, supra note 158, at 609-10.
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viewed as inconsequential by one agency may evoke a strongly negative
or moralistic response from another. Thus while the school and the
probation department usually acknowledge to varying degrees that
deviance is a product of social circumstance, other agencies, such as the
police, necessarily operate upon the premise of free will and individual
guilt.1 12 If privacy may be defined in terms of personal autonomy, it is
essential that the juvenile possess some capacity to present himself in
different lights to different audiences.163 To be sure, the right of privacy
is not synonymous with a privilege to deceive; but to the extent that
the individual perceives the differences in agencies' normative assump-
tions and chooses to reveal information about himself in response to
one set of institutional values, he may not anticipate dissemination be-
yond the boundaries of the receiving institution's value structure.
Where a juvenile thus relies upon the seemingly tolerant bias of a youth
division and in the course of an adjustment conference offers informa-
tion which could prejudice him when viewed in light of stricter moralis-
tic standards, he can be said to be unfairly injured by the preservation
of such information in a central records bureau.'
In addition, different agencies use the data for very different pur-
poses. Dissemination to an agency providing counseling services is more
easily justified than tender of the same information to governmental
personnel offices or civil service commissions which possess the power
to deny the subject access to significant potential benefits. Even a single
agency can occupy several positions with respect to one individual. For
instance, in the case of the probation department, a single official may in
succession perform a variety of conflicting roles including jailer,
screener, arbitrator, magistrate, investigator, and counselor. 165 Controls
162 See Nelson, Organizational Disparity in Definitions of Deviance and Uses of
Authority: Police, Probation and the Schools, in ScHOOS IN A CHANGING SocerrY 21 (A.
Reiss ed. 1965).
163 Consider the following comprehensive definition of privacy:
The essence of privacy is . . . the freedom of the individual to pick and choose
for himself the time and circumstances under which, and most importantly, the
extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be shared
with or withheld from others.
Ruebhansen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLTJM. L. REv. 1184, 1189 (1965)
(emphasis added).
164 Such information need not implicate him in actual crimes to be prejudical. It
might, for example, reveal him to be a chronic school truant or a member of a juvenile
gang.
165 A three-man panel appointed by the Appellate Division's First and Second
Departments to study juvenile detention facilities in New York City recently reported
that "the Office of Probation is presently performing a number of functions, some of
which conflict with others from legal, philosophic and practical viewpoints." N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 29, 1971, at I, coL 8.
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governing confidentiality within a single agency, and even expungement




Where adjustment procedures exist at juvenile court intake, the
need for police station interviews and for the preservation of data by
police diminishes. Probation officers are presumably better equipped
for the investigatory task; moreover, the element of coercion is dimin-
ished and the record created comes within the court's protective seal.1
67
This last protection is necessary because even statutes that require con-
fidentiality or permit expungement after a period of good behavior have
not successfully curtailed access to police files.168
4. The Occasion for Inquiry
Where probable cause for arrest is lacking, what juvenile informa-
don should police be allowed to record and preserve? The fourth
amendment, augmented by the exclusionary rule, has traditionally been
the bulwark against overzealous police activity. In the recent case of
Davis v. Mississippi169 even simple fingerprinting was proscribed when
based on an illegal arrest. 70 Clearly, however, the exclusionary rule is
only an effective deterrent to unauthorized police practices in situations
where a trial will occur. How is privacy to be protected in situations
where there is no trial? If privacy is a fundamental right, it must be
sheltered by specific rules which regulate not only what information
may be preserved or admitted into evidence, but the occasions and re-
quisite quantum of evidence that trigger the recording process. Al-
166 Truancy reports, for example, should not be maintained by police record custo-
dians after the information is tendered to the school system.
167 For the relative confidentiality of police and court records, see Karst, supra
note 68, at 365; Note, supra note 1, at 805.
168 See Karst, supra note 68, at 369-71. In re Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 200 n4, 310
N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 n.4 (N.Y. City Farn. Ct. 1970), Judge Dembitz took judicial notice of the
inability of the police to protect their records from unauthorized examination.
Both Smith and Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), discuss the state's
responsibility for injury caused by the improper or unauthorized use of data. Smith cites
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957) and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 463 (1958), for the proposition that government inflicted stigma may create vicarious
liability on the part of the state. 63 Misc. 2d at 203 n.1l, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 622 n.11.
Menard cites National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969), to
indicate that governmental liability may exist for improper use of disseminated material
by third parties. 430 F.2d at 492 n.34.
169 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
170 The Court indicated that a search warrant was probably not required for
fingerprinting. Id. at 727. Virtually all the arrested suspects in this case were juveniles.
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though probable cause is unnecessary to place an individual under
police surveillance or to file reports about him, courts might reasonably
rule in situations indicating harassment that suspicion of an objective,
specific illegal act was a prerequisite to at least the more overt forms of
surveillance.' 7 '
The justification for such a limitation on surveillance may be
found in the Constitution. In the first amendment cases, the "obtrusive-
ness" of the surveillance has often been a determinative factor.172 If
records will actually be disseminated, the absence of illegal conduct
arguably renders the record-keeping procedure constitutionally ques.
tionable. 73 If the record is not disseminated, however, courts to date
appear to be reluctant to find the requisite "chilling effect" on first
amendment freedoms. 74
5. Limitations on Timeliness
While individuals change over time, information, once recorded,
tends to remain static. This alone provides considerable potential for
distortion. The problem is complicated, moreover, by stringent controls
171 But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 809 (1971), in which the Supreme Court up-
held the right of welfare caseworkers to make warrantless home inspections. The decision,
however, made clear its assumption that no law enforcement purpose was being pursued.
172 See Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (enjoining New
York City Police Commissioner from posting uniformed officers in book stores that were
alleged to have sold pornographic materials, on the theory that their presence "chilled"
the exercise of first amendment rights); Local 309 v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind.
1948).
In Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970), rev'g 106 NJ. Super. 545, 256
A.2d 298 (Ch.), the New Jersey Supreme Court overruled a lower court decision that
surveillance of protest demonstrations pursuant to a state attorney general's directive
"overbroadly" impaired first amendment rights. The lower court had used the over-
breadth doctrine because the directive had failed to distinguish lawful from unlawful
protest activities, even though the resulting reports were available only to law enforce-
ment bodies.
Technically, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and
remanded for further findings. The court made clear, however, its feeling that the
existence of files alone was an inadequate "chill" to merit injunctive relief: "The basic
approach must be that the executive branch may gather whatever information it reason-
ably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and pre-
ventive." 56 NJ. at 229, 265 A.2d at 688. However, the court emphasized where the nature
of the surveillance was "obtrusive" or where intent to chill could be shown, judicial relief
was appropriate. Id. at 226-27, 265 A.2d at 687.
173 In Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970), the Public Printer and
the Superintendent of Documents were enjoined from distributing a House Internal
Security Committee report concerning the participation of "New Left" political activists
in campus "disorders."
174 ACLU v. Westmoreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. 111. 1971) (finding that "only
the thin-skinned" could have been chilled by what the court termed a "Keystone Cops"
form of surveillance of political activists by United States Army agents).
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governing the destruction of state records.175 Particularly in the case of
the juvenile, it is clear that yesterday's record does not accurately de-
scribe today's individual.176 Thus, temporal limitations under which
"stale" data are discarded must be created. For example, it has been
suggested that when the juvenile exceeds the maximum age for Y.D.
reports and thus escapes the attention of the Youth Division his file
should be destroyed. 77
CONCLUSION
The problems of controlling the collection and dissemination of
personal data have not yet been seriously faced by records custodians.
Formulation of meaningful controls on the most elemental level re-
quires that three types of safeguards be implemented: (1) limitations
on access; (2) establishment of criteria of relevancy to govern both
dissemination and the authorized scope of inquiry; and (3) formali-
zation of a methodology to assure objectivity.
On the juvenile level, reform should ensure at a minimum the ex-
clusion of prearrest data from the sentencing process and the total
transfer of responsibility for adjustment of lesser charges to civilian
agencies. The receipt of unverified police information by these latter
agencies, however, presents a closer question. Court diversionary pro-
cedures are obviously preferable to prosecution of all juveniles, but such
transfers should not be accompanied by unanswerable data which im-
plies guilt. The juvenile should be given some opportunity to challenge
the accuracy of such reports and thereby supplement or, in an appro-
priate case, expunge the record. 78 Indeed, he should have the right to
175 A general doctrine that public records may not be destroyed except under careful
controls appears to have been codified in most states. See, e.g., N. Y. PuB. Orr'nCaS LAw
§ 65-b (McKinney 1952).
178 The relationship between records and expectations demonstrated by Robert Rosen-
thal and Lenore Jacobson in their Pygmalion experiments is particularly relevant in this
regard. R. ROSErnAL & L. JAcoBsoN, supra note 85,
177 STAFF REPORT 79. If state law required the retention of records in some form,
the Staff Report further proposed that the Y.D. file be, in effect, sterilized by removing
the youth's name from all master cross-reference files. Id. Under the final stipulation in
Cuevas, all Y.D. cards on juveniles over the age of 17 were to be destroyed annually.
Note 4 supra.
178 Expungement statutes have been recently drafted in regard to credit information.
See, e.g., New York's recent Credit Data Reporting Act (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 370-76
(McKinney Supp. 1971)), which allows a person denied credit to demand the disclosure
and to challenge the accuracy of information on him contained in credit agency files.
Juvenile expungement statutes to date, however, have focused only on whether the youth
is "rehabilitated" and not on the validity of the charge. See Karst, supra note 68, at
369-70. The proper issue, of course, is the accuracy of the information.
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resist efforts at "adjusting" his behavior where he maintains his in-
nocence. In such situations he should be able to insist that the charges
be prosecuted or dismissed and not ambiguously left open.
Controls on the scope of police inquiry and the occasions on which
reports may be recorded are also essential if harassment and stigmatiza-
tion are to be prevented. This article has not attempted to set hard and
fast rules to remedy these problems in the belief that a balancing pro-
cess might be more beneficial. Moreover, the urgent questions concern-
ing the record-keeping activities of states still face threshold problems
of justiciability-problems which cases such as Menard and Weston
have just begun to address.
Once these initial barriers are overcome, there still remain other
subtle and perplexing problems. The scope of this article has been lim-
ited to police records. Yet police records which present particularly
acute problems are not unique. Information equally speculative and
anecdotal flows regularly from various other sources to agencies
dealing with juveniles. This article has not examined the separate prob-
lems of school, welfare, or clinical records, but to a large degree such
records raise issues similar to those involved in police records.
According to conventional wisdom, juvenile welfare can be suc-
cessfully served only if the activity of all public agencies dealing with
minors is jointly planned and conducted.179 Essential to this effort is
the "careful sharing of data"180 by those agencies which are said to
occupy a "case finding"'81 position with respect to the child. The prac-
tical consequence of such a theory is the extensive dissemination of col-
lected data. Thus the American Bar Foundation survey found that
even the files of psychiatric clinics are customarily accessible to pro-
bation workers. 8 2 Similarly, sociologists David Goslin and Nancy
Bordier have reported that in a majority of the school systems they
surveyed, the entire file of a student was accessible to various law en-
forcement officials although usually closed to parents. 83
179 Brown, Coordinating Professional Efforts for Children with School Problems, 15
CHILDREN 214 (1968); Buxton, Developing Guides for Cooperation Between the Juvenile
Court, Welfare Department, and Schools, 47 CHILD WEIARE 266 (1968).
180 Brown, supra note 179, at 218.
181 Stickney, Schools Are Our Community Mental Health Centers, 124 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1407, 1409-10 (1968).
182 SENTENCING 34-35; cf. D. NEWMAN, supra note 10, at 15.
183 Goslin & Bordier, Record-Keeping in Elementary and Secondary Schools, in ON
RECORD: FILX.ES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE 29, 56-57 (S. Wheeler ed. 1969). In the
majority of cases the entire file was available to FBI and other federal agents, while in
a minority of cases the full file was accessible to local law enforcement officials. For the
standard form sent by intake officials in New York City's Family Court to schools and
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Even assuming that interagency cooperation is indeed essential,
the absence of systematic review or evaluation of data tendered makes
possible distortions at least as great as those possible in police records. 84
Ironically, tender of these records frequenlty seems to occur in situa-
tions that violate the school's or welfare department's oft-proclaimed
in loco parentis responsibility towards the child.8 5
Implicit in these practices is a basic confusion of responsibilities.180
Is the record custodian an agent of the general public welfare or does
he owe a paramount duty of confidentiality to the child? 87 At present
other agencies, see J. Coffee & L. McGaughey, Materials on School and Police Record-
Keeping 4-5 (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Youth Law, Natl Insti-
tute for Educ. in Law & Poverty, Sept. 10-12, 1970). The form requests information
about the youth's behavior at school and the results of the school's efforts to remedy
deviant behavior. The author has on occasion seen three- or four-page replies tendered
by schools to intake officials.
184 A good summary of the range of accessible data is provided by the report of a
recent national conference on student records:
The total set of student personnel data extant in a school at a given time ranges
from tentative uncorroborated reports on alleged student behavior to highly
stable information. To illustrate: on one end of the continuum a memo may
contain a report or allegation that a particular student molested a child, dis-
rupted a class, or wept for several hours yesterday; at the other extreme records
will show that a student has completed grade five, that he received a specified
score on a nationally standardized test, and that he has a particular attendance
record. These differing kinds of data require differing arrangements for security
and access.
RussELL SAGE FOUNDATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE CoLLEcTIoN, MANTENANCE AND DIssEhu-
NATION OF PUPIL RrcoRDs 20 (1970). See J. Coffee & L. McGaughey, supra note 183, at 6, 16.
185 A classic case of failure to recognize fiduciary obligations recently occurred in
New York City: student attendance records were for a brief time referred to a local
welfare center. The welfare center would then terminate the public assistance of students
whose eligibility was conditioned upon school attendance.
188 Illustrative of the contradictory position of many agencies is N.Y. STATE DE"r or
Euc., MANUAL ON PUPIL REcoRDs (1970), which elaborately affirms the student's con-
stitutional right to privacy, and then quietly accepts a principle of implied consent:
[T]ransfer of pupil information must not be made without the consent, expressed
or implied, of the pupil's parents. Parental consent may reasonably be implied
where the student transfers to another school; where he has applied for admission
to another school; where he has applied for admission to an institution of higher
learning; or where he has made application for employment.
Id. at 11.
Such an artificial presumption of consent vitiates the concept of privacy and ignores
the very likely possibility that a student may wish to find employment without disclosing
records. What "implied consent" really means is that the school feels it has a primary
obligation to protect employers or other institutions rather than the student.
1s Another case illustrative of the tensions under which public custodians of records
function recently occurred in the New York City school system. On October 28, 1970,
Chancellor Scribner issued a directive embodying the recommendations of a national
conference on school records conducted under the auspices of the Russell Sage Foundation,
to the effect that:
"[n keeping with the individual's right to privacy, all school personnel are re-
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it appears that the custodians of juvenile records still conceive of gov-
ernment as a monolith without conflicting purposes, within which any
form of data can be legitimately circulated. In answer, a counter-ratio-
nale needs to be formulated that the interest of the state in being well
informed is not absolute. Nor is it a unified interest, but rather a col-
lection of competing and often conflicting subsidiary interests. Ulti-
mately, the ability of American society to recognize the priority of
privacy over its bureaucracy's hunger for data will be a measure of its
maturity.
minded that no information concerning any student in our schools may be made
available to any person or agency" unless there is 'written consent by a parent
... or there is a court order for such information.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1970, at 23, col. 5. Challenging the directive, the High School
Principals' Association asserted that such a rule would create "chaos" and "adversely affect
the welfare of many students" by curtailing the power of school authorities to send
recommendations to employers or information to police officials. Id. at cols. 4-5. In
reality, this criticism translates into a statement that the school system has a duty to
protect the public by forewarning it of misbehaving students. Such a position may in
extreme instances be defensible, but it is hardly compatible with the school's in loco
parentis power over its students.
